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Abstract 
 
 During the 2012 Malian civil war, one of the main actors was Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, Al-Qaeda’s most profitable regional franchise. As a result of the group’s specific 
interactions with the MNLA, an ethno-separatist militia that instigated the civil war in the first 
place, and the civilian population of Northern Mali broadly, AQIM was able to entrench itself 
within and ultimately control much of Northern Mali. This research demonstrates the three key 
elements of AQIM’s success in Mali. First, the group sought local support by doing two things: 
allying with the MNLA, which gave AQIM access to the region’s ethnically-Tuareg population 
and providing assistance to Northern Mali’s civilians broadly in an attempt to win their “hearts 
and minds.” Second, AQIM was able to eliminate its competition in the area when it ended its 
alliance with the MNLA, after the group abused local civilians, and expelled the MNLA from 
Northern Mali. And finally, with the support of new local actors like the Tuareg-Islamist group 
Ansar Dine, AQIM was able to implement its fundamentalist interpretations of Sharia across the 
territory it now controlled. Gaining support from the local population, eliminating the 
competition and ultimately implementing its ideology across Northern Mali are the three 
elements to AQIM’s success.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
 In the midst of the 2012 Malian Civil War, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
alongside local militias and other Islamist groups, seized control of the entirety of Northern Mali, 
roughly 827,000 square kilometers of land that makes up over two-thirds of Mali’s entire 
territory.1 An Al-Qaeda affiliate operating in Northern and Western Africa, AQIM had allied 
with a local ethno-separatist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA). AQIM fought the Malian government’s presence in the region and assisted the MNLA 
in its fight for an independent Northern Mali, a region the MNLA refers to as Azawad. Over the 
course of the alliance, a military coup in Southern Mali in the country's capital, Bamako, caused 
the Malian government to fall into disarray. Out of the ensuing chaos in Southern Mali, the 
MNLA and AQIM seized control of all of Northern Mali as government forces fled south. The 
groups jointly held this territory for a few months, until the end of June 2012, when AQIM, with 
help from fellow Islamist organizations, Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in 
West Africa (MUJAO), turned on their ethno-separatist ally and pushed the MNLA out of 
Northern Mali entirely. The military coup had allowed AQIM and the MNLA to take control of 
all of Northern Mali, and by pushing the MNLA out, AQIM and its affiliates now had the entire 
region to themselves. Upon gaining complete control of the area, AQIM began to implement its 
fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia, usually known as the values and codes of conduct that 
compose Islamic law, onto the civilian population.2 Northern Mali soon became a sort of pseudo-
caliphate, an area governed by fundamentalist Sharia, devoid of any form of Malian government 
influence and controlled instead by Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM — a regional franchise of a 
large and well-known transnational terrorist network that espouses fundamentalist interpretations 
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of Islamic texts.  
 AQIM’s success, however, was not because the group simply arrived in Northern Mali, 
struck a deal with the MNLA and then sidelined its new ally. The group’s success in the region, 
is demonstrated by AQIM’s eventual control of over two-thirds of all of Mali, AQIM’s strategic 
alliances with local actors and the group's efforts at consolidating popular support among the 
region's civilian population. These actions ultimately allowed AQIM to seize control of the 
entirety of Northern Mali by the end of the summer of 2012, after eliminating its ally-turned-
competitor, the MNLA.  
  
AQIM 
  AQIM has its roots in a militia movement from Algeria, the Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat (GPSC), originally formed as an anti-government group in 1998.3 The GSPC was 
created by a faction of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), an opponent of the Algerian government 
during the Algerian Civil War, who condemned the GIA’s indiscriminate abuses of civilians.4 
The GSPC enjoyed widespread support among Algerians when the group pledged to continue 
fighting the Algerian government while also working to prevent the unnecessary deaths of 
innocent civilians.5 By 2003, the GSPC had verbally pledged its allegiance to Al-Qaeda’s global 
jihadist movement and Osama Bin Laden and became a formal, name-brand affiliate on 
September 11, 2006, adopting the name Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.6 AQIM has been 
operating in Mali, specifically Northern Mali, since its founding in 2006, where it conducts a 
variety of activities, including kidnapping European tourists and holding them for ransom, a 
major source of the group’s revenue, and taxing traffickers utilizing the region’s trade routes.7 
  Since its formal founding in 2006, AQIM has become Al-Qaeda’s wealthiest regional 
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franchise and has spread across Western Africa into Mauritania and more recently Mali’s 
neighbor, Burkina Faso. On January 15, 2016, AQIM launched devastating attacks in Burkina 
Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, when three individuals affiliated with the group stormed a hotel 
and coffee shop and open fired into a crowd, killing 30 people and wounding 70.8  
  Despite investments and resources being funneled into counterterrorism efforts in 
Western Africa, AQIM has continued to be a formidable and resilient force in the region. In 
2005, the US established the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a joint 
initiative between the State Department, the Department of Defense and USAID, to assist 
Northern and Western African countries in their efforts to eradicate extremism within their 
borders. Mali, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso are all member countries.9 In 2014, the French 
government announced the beginning of Operation Barkhane, a military operation formed to 
counter the activities of terrorist organizations in Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Chad. 
Roughly 3,000 French soldiers were deployed to the Northern and Western Africa.10 Despite the 
efforts of the US and France, AQIM is still capable of launching large attacks across the region, 
demonstrated by the January 2016 attacks in Ouagadougou. 
 AQIM to some extent demonstrates behaviors found in Al-Qaeda as an organization 
overall, especially in the group’s efforts to create and maintain popular support. As an Al-Qaeda 
affiliate, AQIM is a member of a transnational terrorist network that has proven itself to be 
capable of operating on a global scale. Al-Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, 2001, the US 
embassy in Kenya in 1998, Madrid’s public transportation in 2004, and the 2005 London bus 
attack all demonstrate Al-Qaeda’s ability to wage terrorist violence in places that are generally 
perceived to be safe. Additionally, these attacks demonstrate Al-Qaeda’s ability to operate in a 
variety of contexts, an ability that is further exemplified by the group’s prolific network of direct 
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franchises and loose affiliates. Direct Al-Qaeda franchises include Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) — 
prior to its evolution into the Islamic State. “Al-Qaeda” as a term refers broadly to the 
organization overall, including its affiliates, like Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Eastern Africa and 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.11 Al-Qaeda’s ability to operate in diverse contexts is a 
testament to the group’s ability to entrench itself into the social, political, and economic fabric of 
wherever it happens to reside. Much of this behavior is explained by the belief among many 
high-ranking Al-Qaeda officials that their movement must have the support of the global Muslim 
community, the umma, in addition to the local community.12 In order to gain said support the 
group and its various affiliates must conduct themselves in a manner that is appealing to both of 
these communities.13 
 None of the areas Al-Qaeda operates within are vacant of local actors – these Al-Qaeda 
affiliates and franchises do not operate in vacuums – meaning the group must to some extent 
interact with local actors as it operates in its respective contexts. Al-Qaeda's senior leadership, or 
Al-Qaeda Core (AQC), has extensively interacted with the Taliban governments in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan where the group’s senior leaders reside and operate.14 During the Iraq War, Al-
Qaeda in Iraq worked with and fought alongside local Sunni militias against their Shia 
counterparts.15 And in West Africa and the Sahel, AQIM interacts with a variety of groups, 
including ethnic militias, various kinds of traffickers, and other extremist organizations.16 Al-
Qaeda affiliates and franchises consistently interact with other actors with other goals.  
 Like most terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda relies on the support of global and local 
audiences and has proven itself to be extremely adept at fostering positive relationships within 
the locales it operates, employing a variety of tactics to do two things: gain support of the 
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civilian population broadly and the support of prominent local actors. The support of both of 
these local actors is directly influenced by public perception of Al-Qaeda – if the local 
population finds the group’s actions reprehensible or generally appalling, then Al-Qaeda risks 
losing the support of the people they operate among. As a result, Al-Qaeda concentrates on its 
public image, or more colloquially, it hopes to get “good PR” to entrench itself in the local 
context by gaining local support.  
To gain the support of an area’s population broadly, Al-Qaeda works to improve its 
image among the masses, often by demonstrating charitable behaviors towards civilian 
communities. This tactic could involve assisting struggling civilians by providing food, 
medicine, or other necessary supplies. It could also involve providing economic or financial 
incentives to join Al-Qaeda, especially in areas that are economically depressed and home to 
poor or struggling communities. By utilizing these tactics, Al-Qaeda works to gain the support of 
the region’s masses and appeal itself to the various communities and civilians it intends to 
operate among.  
In addition to the masses, Al-Qaeda also works to gain support from more prominent, 
important local actors. These strategic alliances between Al-Qaeda and prominent local actors 
helps Al-Qaeda work to entrench itself among the most important and prominent groups of a 
specific context. As a result, Al-Qaeda attempts to eventually win the support of these important 
local actors and attempts to get them to support its own goals for the region. Once adequately 
entrenched, the honeymoon phase of the relationship between Al-Qaeda and these local actors 
often ends when Al-Qaeda begins to implement its version of Sharia onto the local population. 
Local dissenters are then often targeted and in some cases completely expelled from the area, 
dissuading other potential dissenters from taking further action against their new jihadist rulers. 
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This common pattern of behavior is demonstrated by AQIM in Mali.  
 
The Malian Civil War & AQIM Success 
 The 2012 Malian Civil War was instigated by the MNLA, an ethno-separatist movement 
that claims to represent the interests of Northern Mali’s Tuareg population, a formerly nomadic 
ethnic minority that has revolted against the Malian government four times since Mali’s 
independence from France in 1960. The Tuaregs view the Malian government as their largest 
adversary, and the nature of this conflict is rooted in both ethnic and regional tensions. Prior to 
the 2012 conflict, the most recent Tuareg uprising took place in 2006, which ended with a peace 
agreement between Tuareg militias and the Malian government. During colonial times and just 
prior to Mali’s independence from France, Tuaregs had kept the ethnically different "black" 
Malians living in Southern Mali as slaves.17 Upon gaining independence, Mali’s new 
government was based entirely in the country’s southern region, away from the Tuaregs, who 
were now left to be governed by their former slaves and as a result have an adversarial 
relationship with the Malian government.18 While the Tuaregs have historically abused Mali’s 
sedentary ethnic groups, in the wake of Mali’s independence and with political power now on its 
side, the Malian government ensured that Northern Mali was underdeveloped and lacking in 
services. As a result of these practices and a devastating drought in Northern Mali in the 1960s 
and 1970s, historically nomadic Tuaregs were forced to seek refuge in other countries to live 
sedentary lives. At the worst of Northern Mali’s neglect, an estimated hundreds of thousands of 
Tuaregs died, as the drought destroyed crops, killed livestock, and caused widespread disease 
and starvation.19 Thus, the animosity between Northern and Southern Mali is rooted in historical 
grievances between rival ethnic groups that reside in geographically different regions — the 
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black Malians to the south generally dislike the Tuaregs given their penchant for racism and 
history as slave-holders, while the Tuaregs to the north dislike the black Malians because they 
view these people as their former slaves and therefore “lesser,” and because the Malian 
government has systematically ignored and underdeveloped their historic homeland.20 
 In January of 2012, the MNLA declared war against the Malian government, and the 
fourth Tuareg uprising began.21 The Malian military was sent to suppress the rebellion, but was 
both inadequately outfitted and inadequately trained to combat the Tuareg fighters.22 The 
MNLA’s ranks consisted largely of seasoned soldiers with prolonged experience fighting under 
former Libyan Prime Minister Muammar Qaddafi, many of whom were armed with weapons 
stolen from Libyan stockpiles or captured from the Malian military.23 These two factors; the 
differences between machinery and training between the MNLA and the Malian military, 
ensured that the MNLA was a superior fighting force to the Malian military, which in turn 
contributed to the MNLA’s joint control of the region alongside AQIM.  
 
Three Steps to Success   
 In January 2012, AQIM and its local affiliated groups, Ansar Dine and MUJAO, began 
working in conjunction with the MNLA.24 Ansar Dine, meaning “Defenders of the Faith,” was 
established in late 2011 by Iyad Ag Ghali, a well-known Tuareg leader who wanted to 
implement fundamentalist Sharia across Mali and as a result of his radical beliefs was not given a 
leadership role within the MNLA.25 MUJAO was a splinter group of AQIM that shared similar 
ideologies and goals with both AQIM and Ansar Dine. The reason for the split between AQIM 
and MUJAO is unclear, although both a lack of black Africans in AQIM leadership positions and 
MUJAO’s desire to begin operating further into West Africa are possibilities.26 Despite the 
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group’s split, MUJAO praised AQIM and the two groups maintained fairly cordial relations, as 
both groups shared similar goals for Northern Mali.27  
 Upon allying with the MNLA, AQIM and its affiliates worked to gain access to the social 
fabric of Northern Mali by taking on and championing the local separatist cause, in this case the 
fight for an independent Azawad. The MNLA was and is a prominent organization in Northern 
Mali, and therefore a strategically important actor in AQIM’s attempts to embed itself in the 
region. In addition to the alliance with the MNLA, AQIM began pursuing the support of 
Northern Mali’s civilians by providing goods and services to underserved communities. By 
assisting the struggling civilian population, AQIM worked to win the support of Northern Mali’s 
civilian communities more broadly. Both of these behaviors, allying with a local organization 
and providing aid to struggling local communities, were deliberate attempts at winning favor 
with two segments of the local population.  
 Despite blatant contradictions between the groups’ ideologies, the alliance between 
AQIM, its affiliates, and the MNLA lasted into the summer of 2012, as AQIM used the MNLA 
to gain access to Northern Malian society. As a result of a coup against the Malian President 
Touré, the MNLA and its new Islamist allies were able to overtake almost the entirety of 
Northern Mali in the wake of the political chaos erupting in the south.28 The MNLA, AQIM, 
MUJAO, and Ansar Dine jointly controlled the region for several months, despite the 
aforementioned ideological differences – the MNLA is a strictly ethno-separatist organization 
that championed the creation of a secular Azawad state.29 Comparatively, AQIM, MUJAO, and 
Ansar Dine are jihadists organization that, like the rest of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, wish to one 
day recreate an Islamic caliphate governed by strict interpretations of Sharia. AQIM allied itself 
with and jointly controlled Northern Mali alongside the MNLA, as part of a concerted effort to 
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embed itself further into the social and political fabric of the region.30 
 The alliance between the MNLA and AQIM, however, became problematic when the 
MNLA began to abuse Northern Malian civilians, especially those belonging to other ethnicities. 
The alliance dissolved in June 2012 after MNLA fighters looted, robbed, and raped civilians, 
demonstrating the general lack of control the MNLA leaders had over their subordinates.31 IAs a 
result, the MNLA ruined its own reputation with Northern Mali’s civilians – and by association, 
jeopardized the public support that AQIM and its affiliates, the MNLA’s new allies, were hoping 
to foment by their previous efforts to provide services to these same civilian populations. Thus, 
at this time, the alliance between the MNLA and AQIM was not only unhelpful in the pursuit of 
AQIM’s goals in the region, it was likely detrimental to said goals. AQIM and its affiliates 
needed to end the alliance with the MNLA to save their project in Northern Mali, while still 
maintaining the support of the area’s civilians.  
 In late June, AQIM and its affiliates successfully severed their relationship with the 
MNLA and expelled the Tuareg group from Northern Mali, preserving their public image among 
the local civilians while also effectively eliminating their main competitor.32 As members of a 
large and wealthy transnational terrorist network franchise, AQIM was better armed, better 
funded, and better trained, and as a result was able to expel its former allies from Northern Mali. 
AQIM and its affiliates were able to use the transgressions of their former allies to further 
entrench themselves in the local context and to gain additional popular support from local 
civilians who had complained to them about the MNLA’s actions by ending their relationship 
with the MNLA and presenting themselves as liberators of Northern Mali’s civilians. 
Additionally, AQIM and its affiliates now had no remaining competition in the area and had 
Northern Mali effectively all to themselves. By eliminating the MNLA at the behest of local 
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communities, AQIM was able to simultaneously continue its tactic of gaining popular support 
from the local population while ending the use of its other tactic, allying with a strategic local 
actor. 
  Despite the group’s previous charitable behavior towards Northern Mali’s civilians, the 
niceties ended once AQIM and its affiliates consolidated power across the region. Upon 
becoming one of the few controlling actors in the area, AQIM began imposing strict 
interpretations of Sharia onto the civilians who had just recently complained about the MNLA’s 
abuses.33 AQIM was able to implement this version of Sharia with help from local actors that 
had been radicalized by Islamic fundamentalist groups already within Northern Mali. Most 
important of these actors is Ansar Dine, the aforementioned local organization that shares much 
of AQIM’s ideologies but puts a local, Tuareg face on the group’s fundamentalist beliefs. 
AQIM’s original interactions with the MNLA, prior to the end of the alliance, and AQIM’s 
efforts to further the cause of Azawadian independence had allowed the group to become 
initially entrenched among prominent Tuareg families and individuals. This entrenchment among 
Northern Mali’s Tuareg population was able to continue after AQIM ended its alliance with the 
MNLA due to Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, who founded Ansar Dine. Ghali and Ansar Dine 
gave AQIM more legitimacy among Northern Mali’s Tuareg population, given Ghali’s ethnicity 
and Ansar Dine’s predominantly Tuareg ethnic-makeup. Once AQIM consolidated control of the 
region, Ansar Dine and other strategic local actors on the ground helped AQIM implement its 
form of Sharia law and otherwise assisted the group in achieving its objectives for the region. 
AQIM’s success in Northern Mali is the result of a three-part strategy to gain support 
from the region’s local actors. Strategically allying with the MNLA, while also working to gain 
the support of Northern Mali’s civilians allowed AQIM to gain a foothold among both the 
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region’s prominent actors and the region’s masses. As AQIM worked to gain a hold in the local 
context, it eliminated its competition, specifically the MNLA, when the MNLA began to abuse 
Northern Malian civilians. The MNLA’s actions gave AQIM an opportunity to both eliminate 
competition and consolidate power across the region, all while maintaining the support of 
Northern Mali’s civilians. Finally, upon consolidating control of Northern Mali, AQIM 
successfully implemented fundamentalist Sharia with the assistance of radicalized local actors 
like Ansar Dine, marking the end of the group’s efforts to gain popular support of the population 
broadly. While AQIM had ended its previous tactic of gaining broad popular support, by allying 
with and working alongside Ansar Dine, AQIM repeated its same initial tactic of maintaining 
strategic alliances with prominent and important local actors that it had used in its initial 
interactions with the MNLA. 
 
Methodology 
Delving further into the facets of AQIM’s success required intensive chronological 
research and the consultation of various sources on AQIM, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and the 
MNLA. The three facets of AQIM’s success in Northern Mali are major developments in the 
Malian Civil War, thus AQIM’s three-part success story is demonstrated by the history of the 
war. A variety of sources that documented the war’s development were consulted, namely news 
articles, reports from organizations like the UN and the International Federation for Human 
Rights (FIDH), United States Congressional testimonies, and academic sources. Dr. Stephen 
Harmon’s interviews of Northern Malians living on the ground at this time, from his book Terror 
and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel region: Corruption, contraband, jihad and the Mali war of 
2012-2013, were used to better understand the sentiments of civilians towards the various armed 
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groups that operated in the region and among them. Additionally, eyewitness accounts from 
FIDH reports were also used to better understand the interactions between armed groups, like the 
MNLA, AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO, and the civilians living under their control. Internal 
correspondence between AQIM leaders and subordinates was also consulted, as was the 
MNLA’s official web page (http://www.mnlamov.net).  
Despite the variety of sources consulted, information on the actions and operations of 
terrorist organizations, especially during a conflict like the Malian Civil War, is not always 
widely available. Such was the case for this specific research undertaking and should be 
acknowledged as a limitation of this study. The lack of availability is due to a number of reasons 
– the information simply does not exist, or if it does, specific information on terrorist 
organizations like AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO in Northern Mali may not be accessible 
without a security clearance. Specific examples of these information gaps include: the lack of 
knowledge on the sentiments of the Northern Malian population as a whole towards AQIM as no 
public polling was executed or recommended at the time of the group’s occupation, the explicit 
details of the MNLA’s financial capacities in the summer of 2012, and the specifics of AQIM’s 
organizational capacity at the time of the Malian Civil War. While AQIM certainly is a wealthy 
organization, the specifics of the MNLA’s finances are missing in this research. In addition, 
much of the information available on Northern Mali’s Islamist groups and the MNLA was 
originally written in Arabic and French, respectively, two languages that the researcher does not 
speak. Thus, it should be stated that part of this research relies on the translations of third-parties.  
 In addition to the translations of third-parties, this research relies heavily on the concept 
of “success,” in regard to the success of a terrorist organization. Success in the context of AQIM 
and Northern Mali refers to the ability of AQIM to hold territory and implement its own form of 
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governance on the population. Holding this territory and eventually implementing its own 
version of Sharia onto the population is the final product of AQIM’s three aforementioned 
tactics. As a result, the group’s overarching success is a product of those same three tactics. 
Working to earn the support of the local population, at both the top and bottom levels of 
Northern Malian society, subsequently eliminating a rival group from the region and finally 
implementing its own brand of Sharia are all components of AQIM’s three-fold, sequential 
success in Northern Mali.   
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review 
 
Important Definitions 
 The term “terrorism” notoriously has no universally accepted definition. Even among 
different agencies in the United States government, there is no single, universally accepted 
definition. Generally, however, “terrorism” has been defined as violent attacks against civilians 
in the name of a larger cause, often social or political in nature. In some cases, the definition has 
defined the targets of terrorism as “non-combatants,” as opposed to simply civilians, broadening 
the definition to possibly include those who would otherwise be considered combatants – 
sleeping Marines in Beirut, by this definition, could be considered non-combatants. Those who 
commit terrorism are subsequently called terrorists. This research defines terrorism as violence 
towards civilians committed by non-state actors in the name of larger social or political goals.  
 This research defines AQIM as a terrorist organization, however there are important 
caveats to make to this definition and categorization. Although traditionally Al-Qaeda has 
operated and been categorized as a bonafide terrorist organization, this research finds that Al-
Qaeda affiliate AQIM also demonstrates qualities of both a pseudo-state and an insurgency. 
According to Audrey Cronin, Al-Qaeda as a whole can be defined as a terrorist organization 
because the group has a small membership, attacks civilians, does not hold territory and does not 
“directly confront military forces.”34 Unlike Al-Qaeda, Cronin says, the Islamic State is not a 
terrorist organization, as the group in 2015 boasted over 30,000 fighters, “held territory in Iraq 
and Syria… command[ed] infrastructure, fund[ed] itself and engage[d] in sophisticated military 
operations.” Instead, Cronin argues, the Islamic State is better defined as a pseudo-state with a 
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conventional military. AQIM, however, demonstrates many of the qualities that Cronin says 
qualify the Islamic State as a pseudo-state. From the summer of 2012 to January 2013, AQIM 
held control over Northern Malian territory. Regarding the group’s funding, as a result of its 
kidnapping for ransom operations and involvement in the regional trafficking trade, in 20120 
AQIM was, and is, Al-Qaeda’s most profitable affiliate. And on multiple occasions and with the 
assistance of other local groups, AQIM directly engaged the Malian military, and in some cases 
actively defeated these forces. At the end of January 2013, however, the French were able to 
expel AQIM from Northern Mali, demonstrating that although the group was able to directly 
engage with the Malian military, when put face to face with a specialized and high-capacity 
force, AQIM was no match. Thus, AQIM demonstrates qualities of a terrorist organization and a 
pseudo-state. 
 An additional facet of AQIM’s categorization is the qualities the group shares with 
insurgencies. The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought defines insurgency as an 
“uprising (insurrection) against constituted government which falls short of revolution, rebellion 
or civil war.”35 The Marine Corps Insurgency Field Manual defines insurgency as an “organized, 
protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an 
established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent 
control.”36 An insurgency is successful as a result of its ability to gather support from the local 
population. The overarching goal of an insurgency is to persuade the local population to accept 
the legitimacy of the insurgent forces and its governing forces or institutions. For the purpose of 
this research, the definition provided by the Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary will be at least 
partially used. Insurgency is therefore in this research defined as a revolt against a government 
that does not meet the threshold of a civil war or revolution and relies heavily on the support of 
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the local population and as a result actively courts the support of said population. Much of 
AQIM’s activities are attempts at gaining the support of Northern Mali’s population, so in 
addition to terrorist and pseudo-state qualities, AQIM also demonstrates characteristics normally 
attributed to insurgencies. Thus, the use of terminologies and theories from insurgency and 
counterinsurgency literature is pertinent to better understanding the various facets of AQIM’s 
behavior, seeing as the group demonstrates a wide variety of characteristics including those of an 
insurgency. 
 Finally, the author would like to clarify the meaning of the term “Sharia,” to ensure that 
broad strokes and judgments about the governance system and Islam as a whole are not made. 
When discussing Islamic fundamentalist groups like AQIM, it is crucial to understand that the 
versions of Sharia law these groups espouse are reprehensible to the global Muslim community. 
To many Muslims, these fundamentalist groups themselves are takfir, or non-Muslims, as they 
are seen to be perverters of Islam. This research does not wish to paint Sharia or Islam as a whole 
in a negative light – the forms of Sharia being described and implemented upon the people of 
Northern Mali are selective and not at all indicative of the governance system or the religion as 
most Muslims know it. AQIM’s behavior towards Northern Mali’s civilian populations is 
indicative of the group’s crude interpretation of Sharia, and not the Sharia familiar to most 
Muslims around the world. Thus, the term “Sharia” in this research refers only to the 
fundamentalist interpretations of groups like AQIM, and in no way refers to the governance 
system as a whole.    
 
  A variety of factors could and should be considered when discussing what does and does 
not qualify a terrorist organization as successful, and a discussion of successful terrorism should 
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start with a discussion of terrorist attacks. Attacks are intended to assist a terrorist organization in 
achieving its larger goals. Subsequently, the attention a terrorist organization received from its 
attacks is in turn another way for the group to be successful, as attacks increase support among 
audiences potentially sympathetic to their cause. Thus, through attacks a group can gain support. 
There are, however, other forms of gaining popular support used by terrorists as demonstrated by 
AQIM’s actions in Northern Mali towards struggling civilian populations. The use of “hearts and 
minds” tactics, a term borrowed from insurgency and counterinsurgency literature, demonstrates 
that although attacks are undoubtedly a crucial component of what makes a terrorist organization 
successful, the support of a specific population or audience is also important. Ultimately what 
makes a terrorist organization successful is the support the group has among its desired 
audiences – this support can be gained from attacks or other behaviors, like the provision of food 
and medicine to struggling communities. Counterinsurgency and insurgency scholars like Kalev 
Sepp and Richard Shultz argue that both insurgents and counterinsurgent forces need the support 
of the local population, and to gain this support must attempt to win the “hearts and minds” of 
said local population. AQIM’s pursuit of popular support mirrored the tactics typically used by 
insurgencies and counterinsurgency forces, as the group actively worked to win the “hearts and 
minds” of the population it was operating among.  
  Attacks and gaining support from a desired or specific audience are two potential 
indicators of success for terrorist organizations, but AQIM’s success in Northern Mali is best 
indicated by the group’s eventual implementation of fundamentalist Sharia. AQIM’s path to 
success in Northern Mali, exemplified by the aforementioned implementation of Sharia, is three-
fold and sequential, as the group was able to build on previous successes – gaining support and 
initial entrenchment in the region was followed by eliminating the MNLA, which was then 
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followed by the implementation of AQIM’s version of Sharia.   
 
Meaning of Success 
  A contributor to AQIM’s success in Northern Mali was the group’s positive interactions 
and alliances with various local actors, and not necessarily the group’s direct tactical operations 
like its fight against the MNLA – although expelling the MNLA certainly helped facilitate later 
success. The positive interactions and alliances helped AQIM build support, which is to some 
extent important to all terrorist organizations. These organizations, however, are not all the same 
and as a result often measure the success of their operations differently. Operating in different 
contexts, championing different causes and working against different adversaries all contribute to 
different types and measurements of success among terrorist organizations.   
  There are, however, some standard activities and behaviors that contribute to a terrorist 
organization's success that are found across a number of organizations, most obvious of these 
activities being the efficacy of a group's attacks. The analysts at Stratfor argue that terrorist 
organizations, and especially Al-Qaeda, are considered to be successful when a completed attack 
serves the group's larger political, social, or economic goals.37 This does not simply mean the 
attack was executed correctly and was carried out as planned; a truly successful attack helps the 
group’s broader agenda. The most effective example of this form of success is the political 
fallout resulting from Al-Qaeda's attack on Madrid's railways on March 11, 2004.38 The attack 
was successfully executed – 10 cellphone activated bombs were strewn across four different 
trains during morning rush hour and subsequently detonated.39 Thus, tactically speaking, the 
attack was immensely successful, and left 191 people dead and thousands more wounded.40 
Politically and socially speaking, the attack was also immensely successful. Just weeks prior, Al-
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Qaeda had called on the Spanish people to vote out the People's Party from the country's 
legislature, the majority party that supported Spain's involvement in the growing US-led 
coalition to fight the war in Iraq.41 Immediately after the March 11 attack, the People's Party 
dropped five percentage points in the polls and was soon overtaken by the Spanish Socialist 
Workers' Party, which did not support Spanish involvement in the Iraq War coalition.42 Not only 
was Al-Qaeda's attack in Madrid tactically successful, killing scores of Spanish civilians, the 
attack also helped instill fear among Spanish citizens largely. As a result, Al-Qaeda was able to 
sway public opinion towards a political outcome that the group preferred.  
  Executing a successful attack, and that attack achieving one of the group’s goals, 
however, are not the only measurements of a terrorist organization's success. An additional 
measurement of a terrorist organization's success is the attention that stems from the group's 
operations, specifically attention from attacks. This attention can result in increased financial 
donations, an influx in recruits and a more favorable public opinion of the terrorist organization 
among its desired audience. Attacks are, in effect, a form of communication between the terrorist 
organization and its desired audiences. Bruce Hoffman argues that the language of terrorist 
organizations is violence, and that these organizations communicate to their audience through 
violence and destruction, choosing their targets and nature of the attack to either gain more 
support from their audience or to strengthen already existing support.43 Support from a specific 
audience is another measure of and contributor to the success of a terrorist organization. 
Although the nature of modern media allows these groups to enjoy the attention of a global 
audience, terrorist attacks deliberately target a more specific audience – as long as that audience 
sees and is receptive to the message, then the organization has successfully communicated 
through violence. Oftentimes, attacks can relay a variety of messages and serve a variety of 
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purposes. For example, Al-Qaeda committing the 9/11 attacks portrays the group’s underlying 
ideology of anti-Western, anti-American sentiment, and as a result would attract likeminded 
individuals to the Al-Qaeda cause, while also invoking fear among Americans.  
 While attacks help a group gather and increase support from its audience, conversely if a 
terrorist organization conducts attacks in an irresponsible manner, the group risks alienating the 
audience it hopes to gain support from. Thus, terrorist organizations must employ a strategic 
calculus when deciding when and what to target. Aaron Clauset found that at least among Hamas 
and Fatah in Palestine, the frequency and severity of the groups’ attacks were inversely related to 
the public opinion of these groups, and once established as representatives of a specific 
population, these groups needed to prevent attacks that may ruin that population’s opinion of 
them.44 Due to their reliance on positive public opinion and therefore public support, carrying out 
attacks that result in the deaths of civilians or choosing to target illegitimate or popular targets 
may result in a decrease in the overall public opinion, and overall popular support, of the terrorist 
organization.45 Conversely, these groups cannot opt out of attacks, since doing so would 
effectively muzzle their ability to communicate with their desired audiences, and could result in 
the rise in popular support of a rival or competing organization that does decide to carry out 
attacks, despite the potential risk of alienating the target audience.46 Thus, when considering 
what and when to attack, terrorist organizations must keep in mind a variety of different factors 
that may contribute to or hurt their support among the public. Specifically, terrorists must 
consider the frequency, severity and target of their attacks and the potential of a subsequent 
increase or decrease in public support. If a terrorist organization fails to consider this strategic 
calculus and is overzealous in its activities, then the group subsequently jeopardizes the support 
of its relevant audiences and, subsequently, its chances of success.  
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Public Popular Support 
 In order to first entrench itself within Northern Mali, AQIM had to have some measure of 
public support, meaning public opinion of the group needed to be positive. This entrenchment 
via positive public opinion among the local population is exemplified by other Al-Qaeda 
franchises, including Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan, who understand that they operate 
to some extent with the permission of the Pakistani government, and as a result have an incentive 
to make their presence at least somewhat conducive or at least not detrimental to the other 
parties’ interests.47 Not considering Al-Qaeda senior leadership and their relationship with the 
Pakistani government, most terrorism organizations and movements operate without the support 
or legitimacy of governments and other official actors. As a result, terrorists rely on the support 
and legitimacy given to them by the local civilian population or other relevant, non-
governmental audience, and hope that this popular support is enough to make up for the 
discrepancies between them and more legitimate governmental actors. This behavior is typical of 
the actions of Al-Qaeda as an organization broadly, and especially within specific Al-Qaeda 
franchises like AQIM.  
 Terrorist organizations need this support in order to operate, and as a result undermining 
the group’s support among a specific population may prove to help counter the group’s 
operations. In his attempt at defining terrorism, Boaz Ganor argues that terrorist organizations 
often rely on a sympathetic civilian population, and that working to undermine this civilian 
support is, or should be, a crucial aspect to counterterrorism efforts.48 Specifically, Ganor argues 
that attacking the terrorist organization’s public relations and legitimacy among the civilian 
population could limit the group’s ability to operate.49 The support of a relevant population or 
audience is undoubtedly a crucial aspect of a terrorist organization’s operations, and as a result 
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these organizations work to gain respect, support, and legitimacy from said relevant populations 
and audiences. To gain this support, Ganor argues, in some circumstances terrorist organizations 
will portray or posture themselves as the liberators and saviors of a specific population or 
audience.50  
 The cliché, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” alludes to this 
behavior, as terrorist organizations hope to justify their actions in terms of liberty, and freedom, 
as opposed to more realistic terms that involve indiscriminate violence towards civilians and 
other noncombatants.51 This revolutionary or liberator posturing is demonstrated by a variety of 
terrorist organizations, including those not necessarily embroiled in a separatist or revolutionary 
conflict, as a way to gather support among the local population and potentially capitalize on local 
and regional grievances.52 In their analysis of Al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Bakir Naji’s works, 
Jarret Brachman and William McCants assert that in their various manuscripts, Naji and other 
jihadi ideologues focus heavily on the relationship between the liberator and the liberated, 
arguing that this relationship should be comparable to the relationship between the mujahideen 
and the local population of the context in which they work.53 In the wake of the American 
withdrawal from Iraq, Naji argues that various jihadi organizations should take advantage of the 
situation in Iraq and invade the surrounding countries, where he argues they will be treated and 
viewed as liberators.54 According to Brachman and McCants, Naji’s concept of a relationship 
between the liberator and the liberated requires the liberators, or the jihadis, to fight justly and 
ensure that they maintain the moral high ground.55 As a result, to maintain their reputation as 
liberators, these organizations must act in a manner that reflects these ideals and do not abuse the 
populations they operate among. These tactics and ideologies are further demonstrated by 
AQIM, who utilized the dichotomy between liberator and liberated in Mali as an attempt to gain 
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support. After the MNLA raped, robbed, and looted civilians, AQIM and its affiliated 
organizations turned on the MNLA, expelling the group from Mali, and subsequently positioned 
themselves as the liberators and heroes of Northern Malian civilians.56 
 In addition to presenting themselves as liberators and capitalizing on the oppression and 
abuse of the local population, terrorist organizations may more directly acknowledge and address 
the local population’s grievances, or otherwise provide an outlet for said grievances. In her work 
on explaining the recent increase of Islamist violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, Caitriona Dowd 
finds that much of that increase can be explained in terms of grievance-based violence, meaning 
violence that stems from historical and contemporary grievances among a specific population.57 
Dowd found that regions within Sub-Saharan and Sahelian Africa that experienced high levels of 
Islamist violence had higher reported rates of economic and political grievances among the local 
Muslim populations.58 Additionally, Dowd found that the same regions experiencing higher rates 
of Islamist violence had also previously experienced higher rates of non-Islamist political 
violence.59 This history of violence, coupled with economic and political marginalization and 
what Dowd calls “triggering events,” all contribute to the outbreak and increase of Islamist 
violence in Sahelian and Sub-Saharan Africa.60 Thus, grievances can be and are exploited by 
terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and AQIM, who gather support among the local population 
by addressing said grievances and capitalize on triggering events to instigate additional violence.  
 Considering the factors outlined by Dowd that contribute to the rise of Islamist violence, 
it becomes clear that those same factors are present in Mali and have contributed to the 
conditions that make Northern Mali a conducive area for AQIM to operate within. Northern Mali 
has been, and currently is, deliberately underdeveloped, disadvantaged, and politically excluded 
from national Malian politics by the Malian government.61 In addition to these grievances, Mali, 
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and Northern Mali especially, has a long history of non-Islamist political violence, a result of the 
four different ethno-separatist Tuareg revolts since the country’s independence from France in 
1960.62 And finally, in 2012 with the fall of Prime Minister Muammar Qaddafi in bordering 
Libya, Mali experienced a sudden influx of ethnic Tuareg fighters that had previously been 
fighting under the former Libyan dictator.63 With these fighters also came a sudden influx of 
Libyan weapons and supplies, taken from unguarded stockpiles.64 The fall of Qaddafi and the 
sudden arrival of ethnic Tuareg fighters and weaponry acted like Dowd’s “triggering events” and 
succeeded in jumpstarting the 2012 Malian crisis.65 The grievances of the Tuareg people and 
Northern Mali overall offered a valuable opportunity for AQIM to embed itself in the local area 
by addressing these grievances and subsequently gaining support. Thus, the rise in Islamist 
violence, and the corresponding presence of AQIM in Northern Mali, are at least partially the 
result of grievances held by the local population, the region’s history of violence and subsequent 
triggering events. The conditions, and specifically the grievances, within Northern Mali made the 
area a conducive context for AQIM’s efforts to gain support and win “hearts and minds.” 
 
Insurgent Tactics 
The need and subsequent drive for public support are common facets of many types of 
organizations and movements, not just terrorist organizations. Insurgents or other actors involved 
in revolutionary warfare also depend on the support of the local populace.66 While AQIM is 
classified as a terrorist organization by the United States government, Sergei Boeke argues that 
the group demonstrates elements of both an insurgency and a terrorist organization.67 According 
to Boeke, AQIM’s efforts to gain control over and support from the civilian population indicate 
the group’s insurgent tendencies.68 Ultimately, however, Boeke categorizes AQIM as a terrorist 
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organization, albeit with insurgent tendencies, two organizational categories that both require 
popular support to operate.69 Colloquially, this form of popular support from the people of 
Northern Mali broadly can be referred to as the “winning of hearts and minds.” It is from 
insurgency and counterinsurgency literature that the term “hearts and minds” stems from — 
United States President John Adams used the term while reflecting on the American Revolution, 
itself an example of an insurgency.70 The term widely refers to gaining the support of the local 
population, but in different contexts can reference different activities. While used mostly in 
counterinsurgency circles, the tactics that terrorist organizations, like AQIM in Northern Mali, 
utilize certainly qualify as attempts at winning “hearts and minds.” Providing food and medicine 
and as a result ensuring some degree of human security to these struggling civilian populations 
were all efforts of AQIM to win over the hearts and minds of Northern Mali’s civilians, as was 
the group’s expulsion of the MNLA after receiving civilian complaints. Thus, a portion of 
AQIM’s success in the region is a result of the group’s adoption of insurgent tendencies in an 
effort to gain broad popular support.  
 
Sharia as Success 
 While adopting insurgent tactics may have helped AQIM consolidate support from 
civilian populations, a defining component of the group’s success was its ability to enforce its 
version of Sharia onto these same populations. The strict enforcement of fundamentalist Sharia 
on a largely unwilling population demonstrates a partial abandonment of the group’s previous 
“hearts and minds” tactics that are more commonly demonstrated by insurgencies, although 
AQIM continued to provide food and aid to struggling populations during its occupation and 
implementation of Sharia. Thus, adhering strictly to insurgent tactics and attempting to win over 
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the hearts and minds of the local civilian population are not the only factors that contributed to 
AQIM’s success in Northern Mali.  
Implementing fundamentalist interpretations of Sharia was the final component of 
AQIM’s success and built upon the group’s previous successes in the region. AQIM’s ability to 
even attempt implementing its version of Sharia is itself demonstrative of the group’s success, 
specifically the group’s success in gaining popular support and eliminating its competition. This 
implementation was made more impressive when the large differences between Western Africa’s 
more liberal Islamic traditions and the fundamental Salafist or Wahhabist ideologies being 
imported by groups like Al-Qaeda, are considered.71 Implementing its own version of Sharia is 
the final portion of AQIM’s success in Northern Mali, and the group was able to do so besides 
the region’s long history of traditionally liberal Islam. 
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Chapter 2 
Strategic Alliances & Hearts and Minds 
  
 The first portion of AQIM’s three-part success in Northern Mali was the group’s attempts 
at gaining popular support from the local population. To do so, AQIM worked to gain support 
from the top of Northern Malian society, among the region’s prominent actors like the MNLA, 
and the bottom of Northern Malian society, specifically the struggling civilian masses. AQIM 
courted the support of the upper-crust of Northern Malian society by allying with the MNLA and 
marrying into important local families and tribes. Trucking in supplies and generally assisting the 
bottom of Northern Malian society and the masses were all efforts of AQIM to gain support from 
the region’s lower classes. These simultaneous top-down and bottom-up tactics helped AQIM 
entrench itself in the region, initiating the first step of the group’s success in Northern Mali. This 
tactic ended when AQIM eventually turned on the MNLA and expelled the group from Northern 
Mali.  
Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership has stressed the importance of popular support to their 
subordinates in other franchises, specifically emphasizing the need to win support from the 
people living in the spaces Al-Qaeda resides and operates within. To do so, Al-Qaeda and its 
regional franchises like AQIM work to foster positive relationships with local populations so the 
group has a receptive local audience for both their ideology and their operations. In an interview 
with The New York Times, AQIM Emir Abdelmalek Droukdal discusses his group’s goals in the 
region, many of which involve saving or liberating the Islamic Maghreb from a variety of 
adverse actors. The group’s stated goals in the Maghreb are to essentially rescue the region’s 
people, a manifestation of the group’s attempts to win the hearts and minds of the people living 
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there. According to Droukdal, AQIM intends to “liberate the Islamic Maghreb from the sons of 
France and Spain,” while also working to “protect [the Islamic Maghreb] from foreign greed and 
the crusader’s hegemony,” meaning that the group intends to counter the French and Spanish, 
and generally Western, influences and presence in the region.72 By Droukdal’s own assertion, 
AQIM’s broad goal in the Islamic Maghreb, which includes Northern Mali, is to liberate and 
protect the region and its people. Presenting themselves as liberators and protectors is a key 
component of AQIM’s attempts at consolidating popular support and in general a key component 
of Al-Qaeda’s entrenchment tactics more broadly.  
 AQIM’s actions in Northern Mali exemplify Droukdal’s statements and demonstrate the 
group’s attempts at consolidating popular support. AQIM pursued popular support in a variety of 
ways, but the group’s tactics can be put into two broad categories: tactics used to strategically 
ally AQIM with important and prominent regional actors, and tactics used to help AQIM gain the 
support of Northern Mali’s population in general. To gain the support of prominent and 
important local actors, AQIM allied itself with the MNLA, demonstrating its willingness to 
champion the MNLA’s cause, a cause that was deeply embedded in the social, political, and 
historical fabric of the region. An additional AQIM tactic to gain support from Northern Mali’s 
important and prominent actors was the strategic arrangement of marriages between its high-
ranking operatives and the daughters of important local chiefs and tribes. Allying with the 
MNLA and marrying into prominent Northern Malian families allowed AQIM additional access 
to the region’s social and political fabric. To gain popular support among the masses, or less 
prominent actors, in Northern Malian society, AQIM provided struggling civilian populations 
with a variety of services and other utilities that these people have historically not received. 
AQIM continued its efforts to gain popular support with regular people by practicing generous 
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business etiquette and behaving in a charitable manner. The provision of services and respectable 
posturing were all attempts of AQIM to win support from the masses of Northern Mali, while 
allying with the MNLA was an attempt to win favor with Northern Mali’s more prominent 
actors. This two-pronged approach at gaining local support, from both the top and bottoms of 
Northern Malian society, helped AQIM become successful in the region.  
  
Strategic Alliances 
 At the time the AQIM-MNLA alliance was formed, in January 2012, Northern Mali was 
home to a variety of different armed groups, drug and human trafficking, and other similar illicit 
activities. Within this cocktail of violence, rival armed groups, and trafficking, the MNLA, 
AQIM, and AQIM’s affiliates worked in conjunction with one another to counter the Malian 
government’s presence in the area.73 The alliance was beneficial to both sides: the MNLA now 
had the assistance of a large transnational terrorist franchise to help in its fight for an 
independent Azawad and AQIM was working alongside an important and prominent local 
organization. Allying with the MNLA additionally helped AQIM gain both access to and 
eventually support from Northern Mali’s Tuareg population.  
 AQIM’s ethnic makeup as of January 2012 suggests that the group did not ally with the 
MNLA because individual operatives felt personal allegiances to the MNLA’s fight for an 
independent Azawad, and instead did so to entrench itself among the Tuareg population. Many 
of AQIM’s individual soldiers were Algerian, given the group’s roots in an Algerian anti-
government militia, with other soldiers coming from Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, and Mali.74 
Essentially, this did not have to be AQIM’s fight, as the group had little personal adherence to 
the MNLA’s fight for a secular and independent Azawad. Instead, AQIM took the local cause as 
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its own in order to win favor and credibility among Northern Mali’s Tuareg population. The 
priority of this alliance among Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership is exhibited in a letter sent from 
AQIM Emir Droukdal to his lieutenants in Northern Mali, in which Droukdal references the 
strategic necessity of this alliance and calls the MNLA a “very important wing of the society.”75 
Droukdal’s prioritization of this alliance demonstrates AQIM’s use of strategic alliances to gain 
support from an important section of Northern Malian society, especially since most of AQIM 
was neither ethnically Tuareg nor from Mali. The MNLA’s importance to AQIM stemmed from 
the group’s importance and prominence in the region as a force actively working against the 
Malian government. The Tuaregs were fighters and had already proven themselves to be capable 
of handily defeating the Malian military – in late January 2012, the MNLA had captured and 
executed 80 Malian soldiers at a Malian military base and two months later had captured the 
strategic city of Tessalit from the military.76 The initial alliance with the MNLA contributed to 
AQIM’s success. 
 AQIM explicitly demonstrated its willingness to champion the MNLA’s cause in January 
2012, when the two groups led a joint-attack on a Malian military installation. On January 24, 
2012, AQIM, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and the MNLA attacked a Malian military camp in 
Aguelhok, a town in the north of the Kidal region. Armed attackers from both the MNLA and 
AQIM attacked the camp for several hours until the Malian soldiers ran out of ammunition and 
were taken prisoner.77 Some of the Malian soldiers were tortured and all of them were executed, 
many with their throats slit by their attackers — a signature component of Islamist group 
executions, demonstrating the large Islamist influence and the fingerprints of AQIM and its 
Islamist affiliates on the attack.78 Several days afterwards, the MNLA and the AQIM-affiliated 
Islamist group Ansar Dine claimed responsibility for both the attack and the deaths of over 150 
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Malian soldiers.79 AQIM and its affiliates helped further the MNLA’s cause by attacking this 
military camp, further weakening the Malian military’s presence in Northern Mali.  
 
Strategic Marriages 
AQIM further entrenched itself into Tuareg society and Northern Malian society as a 
whole by marrying into prominent families of various ethnic groups and clans. Like AQIM’s 
strategic alliance with the MNLA, these marriages were strategically arranged between the 
daughters of prominent local families and high-ranking AQIM operatives. In addition, the 
weddings were financed by AQIM. By marrying into the prominent families of Northern Mali, 
AQIM entrenched itself even further into these communities by embedding its operatives into the 
social, and now familial, fabric of the region. Most prominent of these marriages were those 
involving Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a high-ranking AQIM commander who married the daughter of 
an Arab Barabicha chief, integrating himself into an additional ethnic group of Northern Mali.80 
Belmokhtar is said to have later gone on and married three other women from other local tribes, 
including women from prominent Tuareg families.81 The United States and other assisting actors 
struggled and were unsuccessful in their attempts to apprehend Belmokhtar as a result of the 
refuge offered by his new in-laws. The families and clans of his respective wives helped insulate 
both Belmokhtar and AQIM as a whole by providing refuge and protection, making these 
marriages both of strategic and practical importance.82 The relevant authorities and forces were 
unsuccessful in their attempts to apprehend Belmokhtar until sometime between 2013 and 2015 
when Belmokhtar’s death by airstrike was announced by an Al-Qaeda spokesperson.83   
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Hearts and Minds 
 Northern Mali is one of the poorest and most economically depressed regions in Africa, a 
fact that AQIM exploited in its efforts at gaining support from the masses. If the MNLA was 
successful in creating an independent Azawad, roughly two-thirds of Mali’s entire territory, the 
new country would have the smallest GDP of any African country, less than one billion USD.84 
AQIM Emir Abdelmalek Droukdal highlighted the poverty of the Islamic Maghreb and lamented 
that without the assistance of AQIM and the eventual overthrow of the secular and infidel 
governments in the Islamic Maghreb, the “conditions of the poor people, they will not change. 
The poverty will remain plagued in the body of the nation.”85 Positioning himself and AQIM on 
the side of Mali’s oppressed poor, Droukdal further criticized the simultaneous rise in oil 
revenues but drop in living standards across the region, “It is logic that this situation drags us to 
ask this question: Where does the oil and gas money go?”86 In doing so, Droukdal addresses the 
grievances of the region’s civilians in an effort to gain their support by "winning their hearts and 
minds."  
 In the case of AQIM, the phrase “winning hearts and minds” is used to define an array of 
the group’s activities that involve appealing to the broad masses of Northern Mali as a way to 
earn their support. The phrase stems from counterinsurgency literature, where it is used to 
describe the process of gaining respect and support among an insurgent population or a 
population in which an insurgent group operates among or could potentially recruit from.87 
During the Iraq War, American soldiers made the shift away from their initial “shock and awe” 
tactics, or tactics used to subdue a population, to eventually begin seeking to convert the local 
population to the American cause, in an attempt to win over their “hearts and minds” and 
ultimately gain the Iraqi people’s support.88 Winning hearts and minds is therefore contingent on, 
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and aimed at, the local population’s support of an actor. In the case of Northern Mali, this 
involved fostering local support for a foreign actor whose goals affected the population and their 
country. 
 Ensuring support from a local civilian population, according to counterinsurgency 
literature, often specifically involves ensuring the security of said local civilian population. 
Ensuring this security could involve a number of activities, from physically protecting civilians 
from harm to providing food, water, and shelter.89 In Northern Mali and across the Islamic 
Maghreb, AQIM used these tactics to win the local population’s hearts and minds and as a result 
the population’s support. These tactics and basic counterinsurgency practices are further 
mirrored in the advice given by Al-Qaeda leaders, like Osama Bin Laden, who highlight the need 
to support the population the mujahideen is operating among.90  
 In this paper, the term “winning hearts and minds” encompasses all tactics that AQIM 
utilized or exhibited that worked to increase their support among a population of people, 
normally the group’s target audience. In Northern Mali, AQIM was working to gain support 
from local communities by providing basic services and aid and demonstrating generous or 
charitable behavior. AQIM distinguished itself as a generous organization in various interactions 
with local civilians.91 The group arranged various business partnerships with local elites and in 
some cases behaved like an Islamic charity, supporting the poor and providing services that the 
Malian government was either incapable or unwilling to provide.92 Anecdotal evidence of these 
respectable practices include AQIM overpaying struggling merchants and traders for 
miscellaneous goods — one instance of this behavior involved the sale of a goat originally priced 
at CFA 25,000, or about $43 USD, that AQIM paid over double the seller’s original asking 
price.93 Additionally, in Gao and Timbuktu, AQIM and MUJAO declared that the tolls and 
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tariffs of the Malian government were illegitimate in the eyes of Allah.94 A propaganda video 
declaring the illegitimacy of these tolls and tariffs was televised to the people of Gao.95 
 
 “We started prohibiting what Allah the almighty has forbidden, 
including tolls, customs, taxation and fining people. Trading has returned 
to normal; more goods are available than before, and at lower prices.”96 
– MUJAO operative in a video presented to the people of Gao 
 
AQIM and its affiliates became known as the groups with money.97 This generosity increased 
local support and allowed the group to recruit young men from the surrounding areas, pulled in 
by the possibility of money and pushed towards these wealthy groups by Northern Mali’s 
economic stagnation.98  
  According to those living in Northern Mali at the time of AQIM’s occupation, after the 
MNLA had been expelled from the region, AQIM demonstrated a wide variety of charitable 
actions. These actions included distributing money and food, medicating and treating the sick, 
and giving access to SIM cards, which enabled cellular service to remote communities across the 
region.99 AQIM's allocation of services to Northern Mali's civilian population is best 
demonstrated by the group's actions in Timbuktu.  
  At the end of 2012, civilians under AQIM's control in Timbuktu were experiencing 
intense periods of starvation and subsequent tripling of food prices.100 Partnering with and 
working alongside its affiliate Ansar Dine, AQIM actively assisted starving residents. An Al-
Jazeera reporter in Timbuktu at the time referred to AQIM and Ansar Dine as “humanitarians,” 
for working to mitigate the suffering of Timbuktu’s population.101 Ansar Dine fighters led 
caravans of trucks carrying food and medicine to the starving and sick civilians of Timbuktu.102 
Those living in the city’s slums were hit especially hard by the shortage of food and skyrocketing 
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prices, and had come to completely depend on the charity of these groups in order to survive.103 
AQIM and its affiliates were not lacking in financial resources and were willing to assist those in 
need — if those in need then turned around and joined their cause. In Timbuktu’s hospitals, sick 
and starving civilians were treated with the medicine trucked in by Ansar Dine and AQIM. 
According to the same Al-Jazeera reporter, Ansar Dine spokesman Sanda Ould Boumana 
became worried about the state of the local population when starving babies and children began 
to show up at the local hospitals.104 Boumana highlighted that Ansar Dine allowed in almost all 
forms of aid in an attempt to help Timbuktu’s civilians – the only aid they refused was aid from 
evangelical organizations.105  
 By winning the hearts and minds of the local civilian population, AQIM won the support 
of the local population and decreased the potential for communal resistance. This effectively 
entrenched AQIM in the social, political, and economic fabric of Northern Mali and decreased 
the likelihood that its operations in the region would be impeded by local actors. The various 
specific actions the group took to win the hearts and minds of Northern Mali’s communities 
demonstrate the extent to which the group prioritized these sorts of “hearts and minds” tactics. 
Rather than subjecting the population to abuse and mistreatment, AQIM provided for struggling 
local communities as a way to bring the civilian population on AQIM’s side. The alliance and 
provision of services are all direct examples of AQIM’s attempts at winning the hearts and minds 
of Northern Mali’s civilians. 
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Chapter 3 
Getting Rid of the Competition 
  
  The second portion of AQIM’s success in Northern Mali was due to AQIM’s expulsion 
of the MNLA from Northern Mali. AQIM had first worked to entrench itself in the region by 
allying itself with the MNLA and assisting civilian populations. When the MNLA began abusing 
those same civilians, AQIM ultimately responded to civilian complaints and turned on its former 
ally. With the MNLA gone, AQIM had control over the region, and was ultimately able to 
implement fundamentalist interpretations of Sharia onto Northern Malians living under its 
occupation. The MNLA was a secular organization, and by dissolving the alliance, AQIM 
cleared the way for the eventual implementation of its preferred version of Sharia.  
 The most prosperous period for the alliance between AQIM and the MNLA came after 
the Malian military coup in March 2012, when a group of disgruntled junior officers in Mali’s 
military instigated a coup against President Touré, who they accused of giving the military 
inadequate resources to fight the Tuareg rebellion that began earlier that year.106 In the wake of 
this political chaos, the MNLA, AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine were able to take control over 
the entirety of Northern Mali. Just three days after the coup the Malian military abandoned its 
barracks in all three of Northern Mali’s major cities — Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu – to seek 
refuge in Southern Mali.107 As the military fled, MNLA, AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine were 
on its heels. Northern Mali was now entirely in the hands of insurgents and extremists and with 
the coup causing chaos in Bamako the Malian government could do absolutely nothing about it.  
 It was during this period of complete MNLA-Islamist control in Northern Mali that the 
MNLA began to abuse Gao and Timbuktu's civilian populations. On April 1, 2012, exactly one 
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week after the military abandoned its bases in the region, women and young girls living in Gao 
were raped en masse by MNLA soldiers, and shops and government buildings were looted and 
destroyed.108 Although there is no evidence that Islamist fighters were engaged in the same 
activities as those of the MNLA soldiers, by being an ally of the MNLA, AQIM and its affiliates 
risked their support from the broader population by being guilty by association. By abusing these 
civilians, the MNLA threatened the work AQIM and its fellow Islamists had done to win over 
the hearts and minds of local civilians. As a result, AQIM and its affiliates turned on its former 
allies once civilians began to complain.109 AQIM then expelled the MNLA from the region and 
consolidated power across Northern Mali, ending the strategic alliance. By expelling the MNLA, 
AQIM effectively removed its competition from the region, and was able to do so as a result of 
its greater resources and capacities. Eliminating its competition and consolidating control over 
Northern Mali marks another facet of AQIM’s success in the region.  
 
MNLA's Abuses 
 Soon after the MNLA and AQIM took control of Gao and Timbuktu, various reports of 
rape and gang rape began to surface as MNLA fighters assaulted women and girls living in these 
cities and the surrounding areas.110 Eyewitness accounts suggest that the majority of these 
assaults were committed almost exclusively by MNLA fighters, and not their Islamist allies. 
Victims of the assaults and other eyewitnesses describe soldiers wearing Saharan style military 
dress, speaking French and Tamasheq (the Tuareg language), and driving trucks flying the 
MNLA flag; all descriptors attributed to MNLA forces.111 A number of victims described being 
both sexually and verbally assaulted by these men, who called them "dirty slave[s]," "dirty black 
bitches," and "filthy whores."112 The use of these racial epithets further suggests that the 
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attackers were Tuareg MNLA soldiers, as Tuaregs consider themselves to be racially superior to 
black Southern Malians. In addition to the mass rapes of Timbuktu and Gao’s civilians, the 
MNLA actively looted and destroyed businesses and public buildings, many of which were 
schools, churches and hospitals.113 The MNLA also looted and destroyed all of Gao’s 
pharmacies, likely intending to traffic the stolen medicines along one of Northern Mali’s 
numerous trade routes.114 The group then began looting hospitals. During the group’s assault of 
Gao’s hospital, soldiers seized medicine, medical equipment, furniture, and motorcycles that 
belonged to hospital workers; six intensive care patients died as a result.115 There is no evidence 
to suggest that the MNLA soldiers were joined by their Islamist allies in these activities.  
 
 
Fig. 3 The territory held by the MNLA, AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO as of April 6, 
2012, several months after the coup against President Touré. Political Geography Now.  
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AQIM Acts 
  The MNLA's abuses jeopardized AQIM’s efforts to consolidate popular support from the 
population broadly and contradicted the hearts and minds tactics AQIM was using to try to gain 
support from Northern Mali's civilians. As the MNLA continued its rampage across Northern 
Mali, MUJAO, Ansar Dine, and AQIM started receiving complaints from civilian victims at the 
receiving end of the MNLA's abuses.116 In Gao, MUJAO explicitly told the MNLA to stop 
looting.117 According to a businesswoman that had to flee her home in Gao, MUJAO, Ansar 
Dine and AQIM told the MNLA that the looting of Gao's civilians constituted "theft."118 A 
Malian government official told researcher Stephen Harmon that the Islamist groups in Gao had 
responded to complaints about the MNLA's abuses from local people.119 Responding to these 
complaints, by late June, AQIM and its affiliates had decided to end their brief relationship with 
the MNLA.120 When the MNLA did not stop looting and raping, AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar 
Dine turned on the MNLA, presenting themselves as "protectors of the people, protecting them 
from the MNLA."121 Allowing the MNLA to continue these abuses without consequences was 
not an option if AQIM wanted to continue to attempt to gain the support of local communities. In 
order to continue its hearts and minds tactics in an attempt to gain support from the local 
population broadly, AQIM needed to do something about its marauding allies.   
  According to reporters from the Jeune Afrique, the AQIM-MNLA alliance officially 
ended on June 27, 2012.122 On this day, and in response to civilian complaints, AQIM began its 
assault on the MNLA in Gao, and was soon joined by Ansar Dine and MUJAO. The day after the 
alliance officially ended, a joint effort among AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine forced the MNLA 
to flee its former strongholds of Timbuktu, Menaka and Kidal.123 The Islamist militias attacked 
the MNLA, burying the ones they killed in mass graves and ensuring that those still alive were 
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no longer within Mali's borders.124 AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine's offensive against the 
MNLA was quite successful. High-ranking MNLA officials were forced to take refuge in 
Bamako, not the MNLA’s preferred space of refuge given it serves as the capital of the group’s 
main adversary, the Malian government.125 The MNLA spokesman chose to flee even farther, 
seeking refuge in France.126 By September 2012, the MNLA was completely removed from Gao. 
AQIM and its fellow Islamist groups were in complete control of Northern Mali.    
 
 
Fig. 4 The territory held by AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO after expelling the MNLA 
from Northern Mali. At this time the MNLA had been completely expelled from both Gao and 
the region overall. Political Geography Now.  
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AQIM’s Competitive Edge 
 Perhaps the biggest factor in AQIM’s success against the MNLA was the capacity and 
resource disparities between the two groups. AQIM was a large, wealthy affiliate of a 
transnational terrorist network. The MNLA was, and is, a small regional ethno-separatist group 
with few international connections and a small Tuareg diaspora to pull money from. By the 
MNLA spokesperson’s own admission, the group struggled to organize and regroup its soldiers 
after being expelled from Mali by AQIM. In addition to the resource disparities between the two 
groups, the MNLA’s racially-motivated abuses of civilians and the group’s legacy of abusing 
members of other ethnic groups caused a number of ethnic militias and residents of Gao and 
Timbuktu to also take up arms against the MNLA, all eager to oust their former abusers from the 
country.127 Both AQIM’s larger capacities and the MNLA’s lack of popular support allowed 
AQIM to implement the next portion of its strategy in Northern Mali, eliminating its 
competition. 
 AQIM was, and is, one of Al-Qaeda’s most profitable affiliates, bringing Al-Qaeda 
overall financial success – a fact that assisted the group when it began fighting the MNLA.128 
AQIM was an immensely successful affiliate with a large budget as a result of its operations in 
Northern Mali. The MNLA in comparison was not as wealthy, and in fact, once the group was 
expelled from Northern Mali, began to struggle financially. Much of AQIM’s wealth came from 
the group’s kidnapping for ransom (KFR) activities. An investigation by The New York Times 
found that from 2008 to 2014, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates made over $125 million USD solely 
from kidnapping for ransom (KFR), often by targeting European citizens whose countries are 
willing and capable of paying large ransoms.129 Prior to 9/11, Al-Qaeda’s overall budget had 
consisted of roughly $30 million USD.130 According to that Times investigation, from 2008 to 
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2013, AQIM was the largest recipient of funds from KFR – the group made $91.5 million, 
almost three-quarters of Al-Qaeda’s overall KFR revenue during that time period.131 In addition 
to KFR, AQIM utilizes Northern Mali and the Sahel’s long economic tradition of smuggling and 
trafficking by taxing routes commonly used to smuggle illegal narcotics and other illicit goods. 
The group generally looks down upon drugs and similar substances and rarely engages in the 
actual trafficking and smuggling of these goods.132 The group’s primary source of revenue, 
however, stems from its kidnapping operations. The UN estimates that AQIM’s annual budget is 
around $15 million – half of Al-Qaeda’s overall budget just prior to 9/11, and an impressive feat 
for a single regional affiliate.133 
 The MNLA, being a small regional organization, does not have access to the same 
revenue streams as AQIM. According to a woman from Gao, the MNLA had received some 
financial support from Qatar and the Gulf states, and had brought much of their weapons in to 
Mali from Libya after the fall of Gaddafi.134 The precariousness of the MNLA’s financial 
situation was made clear during a December 2012 interview with Bilal Ag-Achérif, the group’s 
leader. At that time, the MNLA was almost completely removed from its former territories in 
Northern Mali and Ag-Achérif was seeking safety in Paris. In the interview, Ag-Achérif directly 
acknowledged that the MNLA was ill-equipped to continue their fight against AQIM, MUJAO, 
and Ansar Dine.135 He alleged that the MNLA’s adversaries were recipients of “drug money and 
hostages [ransom],” and as a result were more financially capable of funding their operations.136 
By comparison, Ag-Achérif said that the MNLA “lacks the means, [our] soldiers do not have 
enough to eat.”137  
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The MNLA’s ruined reputation 
  While AQIM held an edge over the MNLA financially-speaking, AQIM also had the 
support of other local actors to assist in its fight against the MNLA.  The MNLA’s abuse of 
civilians in Gao and Timbuktu did not endear them to other local militias, nor were they as 
popular among Northern Malians as broadly as Emir Droukdal depicted them in his letter to his 
subordinates. While the MNLA certainly played a large role in Northern Mali’s social, political 
and military history, and was an important local actor in this sense, the MNLA lacked support 
beyond the region’s Tuaregs, demonstrating that even among the group’s primary audience there 
was nothing close to universal support. The MNLA’s abuse of civilians gave AQIM an additional 
edge, as the MNLA lost public support and had actually gained other adversaries among other 
ethnic groups. The MNLA’s own actions thus contributed to AQIM’s ability to eliminate its 
competition in the area. In addition to the loss of popular support as a part of the MNLA’s actions 
in Gao and Timbuktu, the four Tuareg rebellions since Mali’s independence from France also 
contributed to the divide between Northern and Southern Mali, and the actions of groups like the 
MNLA only exacerbated that divide. The Tuareg’s attempts to gain independence have caused a 
number of retributive attacks on civilians as Malian soldiers heavy-handedly attempt to squash 
local rebellions.138 As an important local actor, the MNLA may have been a useful ally to AQIM 
as it gave them access to the militant Tuareg population of Northern Mali. But, the MNLA was 
not entirely representative of the region and its other ethnic groups, like the Fulani and the 
Songhai, and while important in the region’s history, did not enjoy immense amounts of regional 
support. Instead the MNLA was seen by many to be an adverse actor.  
 Demographically speaking, the MNLA is not representative of the region as a whole. 
Historically, the fight for Azawadian independence has not been widely championed among the 
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residents of Northern Mali and has, for the most part, been a largely Tuareg undertaking. Given 
the ethnic makeup of Northern Mali, only a fraction of the region’s residents would even be 
remotely receptive to the MNLA’s cause, as Tuaregs make up a very small portion of the region’s 
population. Northern Mali is home to 10 percent of Mali’s entire population, about 1.8 million 
people. In 2009, Tuaregs accounted for just 1.7 percent of Mali’s entire population, putting their 
total population at about 300,000 people — constituting roughly 16 percent of all of Northern 
Mali.139 Numbers are not on their side, and the goals of the MNLA and other Tuareg groups are 
in no way reflective of the desires of all Northern Malians, or even the majority of Northern 
Malians, just considering the demographics of the region. Even among Tuaregs the MNLA does 
not enjoy monolithic support, as the fight for an independent Azawad was only popular among a 
specific portion of the ethnic group. During the 2012 rebellion, Tuaregs fought for both the 
MNLA and the Malian military, with the Malian military using Tuareg units to lead its operations 
against fellow Tuaregs in the MNLA.140 Those involved in the Azawad-separatist cause or other 
various Tuareg groups have also historically been exceptionally factionalized – during the Tuareg 
rebellion in the early 1990s, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) split 
into more than four different groups.141 Thus, the Tuaregs not only made up only a portion of 
Northern Mali’s population, only a specific portion of this ethnicity was willing to fight for an 
independent Azawad. And this final portion of Tuareg’s willing to fight for an independent 
Azawad was highly factionalized.  
 Comparatively, AQIM recruited from all over the Sahel — Mauritanians, Algerians, 
Libyans, and Moroccans were all represented in the group’s ranks. Since the group drew from a 
much larger audience, they were able to raise a much larger force.142 Additionally, the MNLA 
had more than just AQIM and its affiliates fighting against it in summer 2012. When AQIM 
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began to push the MNLA out of Northern Mali, it was joined by its Islamist affiliates but also 
ethnic militias and young Gaoi residents intent on defeating their former occupiers. The ethnic 
militias were Fulbe and Songhai, two other predominant ethnic groups in Northern Mali that had 
historically adversarial relationships with the Tuaregs and formed fighting forces in response to 
the MNLA’s abuses.143 The Tuareg group had harassed and assaulted other ethnic groups to the 
point that those same ethnic groups now mobilized against them, in addition to AQIM and its 
Islamist affiliates.  
 Part of what allowed AQIM to push the MNLA out of Northern Mali was the group’s 
poor reputation among many portions of Northern Mali society. The Tuareg constitute a 
strategically important but numerically small ethnic group, and even among Tuaregs the MNLA’s 
cause was not uniformly popular. The MNLA’s treatment of civilians ultimately led to a backlash 
against the organization, when a number of ethnic militias from a variety of ethnic groups, 
including the aforementioned Fulani and Songhai, also began to fight the MNLA, in addition to 
AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine. The MNLA’s lack of support, the backlash from other ethnic 
groups, and AQIM’s better organizational capacities, larger financial resources and recruitment 
pool helped AQIM and its affiliates ultimately expel the MNLA from Northern Mali. In doing so, 
AQIM and its affiliates eliminated their competition and consolidated power across the entirety 
of the region. 
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Chapter 4 
Sharia and Strategic Alliances  
 
      The third and final component of AQIM’s success in Northern Mali was the group’s 
capacity to implement its own interpretations of Sharia onto the civilians of Northern Mali. 
AQIM once again utilized its tactic of strategic alliances, this time allying itself with local group 
Ansar Dine and its leader Iyad Ag Ghali, who in turn joined AQIM in its implementation of 
fundamentalist Sharia. Thus, AQIM’s third portion of success is in part due to the assistance and 
presence of preexisting radical actors who agreed with AQIM’s interpretations of Sharia. 
Ultimately AQIM’s ability to implement its version of Sharia is itself indicative of the group’s 
success in Northern Mali overall – looking at the group’s actions outlined in this research, the 
final and logical conclusion to the group’s efforts and previous successes is the eventual 
implementation of fundamentalist Sharia. The group first worked to entrench itself, then 
eliminated its competition and consolidated control of the region, allowing the group to enforce 
whatever governance system it preferred. In sum, the previous portions of AQIM’s success are 
stepping stones to the final portion – implementing its own version of Sharia.  
     Once AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine expelled the MNLA from Northern Mali, the 
Islamist allies enjoyed a monopoly over the region’s communities and resources. They then 
began applying and implementing their version of Sharia onto an unreceptive civilian population, 
punishing criminals and destroying local cultural sites, which AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO 
deemed to be idolatrous.144 The involvement of local actor Ansar Dine in the implementation of 
Sharia demonstrates AQIM’s continued use of strategic alliances with local actors. Between 
AQIM’S two allies, Ansar Dine and MUJAO, Ansar Dine is the most relevant of the two as the 
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group largely consists of native Malians, mostly of Tuareg ethnicity, and as a result is the most 
local. MUJAO instead consisted largely of Mauritanians. Like its alliance with the MNLA, 
AQIM’s alliance with Ansar Dine was strategically beneficial as it once again gave the group 
access to the social fabric of the region, and once again did so with the help of a Tuareg 
organization. As a result of Ansar Dine and MUJAO’s assistance, AQIM was able to implement 
fundamentalist Sharia on Northern Mali despite the region’s strong history of tolerant Islam. The 
implementation of Sharia marked the final aspect of AQIM’s strategy in Northern Mali — the 
group now had control over the districts of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou, assistance from local 
actors that agreed with its fundamentalist ideology, and was in adherence to overarching Al-
Qaeda doctrine that dictates its members live by and implement fundamentalist interpretations of 
Sharia. 
 
AQIM’s Strategic Alliance to Implement Sharia 
 With the help of its allies, AQIM was able to implement its version of Sharia across 
Northern Mali. Specifically, it was AQIM’s strategic alliance with Ansar Dine that helped 
implement this form of governance and ideology. Civilians were subjected to amputations and 
stonings, while important cultural sites were destroyed, as AQIM and its allies considered these 
sites to be idolatrous.145 All of the aforementioned actions were conducted by both AQIM and 
Ansar Dine. As it had previously done with the MNLA, AQIM was once again strategically 
allying itself with an important and prominent local group that helped AQIM achieve its goals in 
the area, in this case imposing its brand of Sharia.  
 This imposition of Sharia meant that those who did not act in accordance with these 
fundamentalist interpretations would be punished. These punishments were carried out jointly by 
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AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO at police stations and in public, creating an atmosphere of fear 
among the local population and dissuading any potential dissenters from resisting their jihadist 
overseers.146 According to an International Criminal Court report on the situation in Mali, 
civilians accused of wrongdoing or of breaking this form of Sharia faced "execution, amputation, 
flogging, stoning and beatings."147 Individuals who drank, smoke, committed adultery, or did not 
adhere to a specific dress code were all at risk of being punished.148 Bar owners either fled or 
risked being publicly flogged.149 On multiple occasions, individuals accused of thievery had their 
hands amputated.150 Regular court systems did not prescribe these punishments, nor were these 
punishments doled out arbitrarily. Instead, these punishments are part of AQIM's policies and 
adherence to fundamentalist forms of Sharia.151  
  The assistance of MUJAO and Ansar Dine continued beyond doling out criminal 
punishments. Ansar Dine in particular played a large role in the implementation of Sharia across 
Northern Mali. In addition to stoning, amputating, and flogging civilians, AQIM and Ansar Dine 
attacked and destroyed a number of sites in Northern Mali that held significant religious and 
cultural importance.152 Over the course of two months in the summer of 2012, nine mausoleums 
and two great mosques, all listed on UNESCO's World Heritage List, were deliberately 
destroyed.153 These sites were attacked with axes and picks, and then burned.154 An ICC report 
on the matter states that the impact of this destruction "appears to have shocked the conscience 
of humanity."155 The African Union also released a statement on the destruction of these sites, 
strongly condemning the "senseless and unacceptable destruction of the cultural, spiritual and 
historical heritage of this region."156  
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Radical Local Actors Assist 
 Radicalized local actors like Ansar Dine and MUJAO assisted AQIM’s attempts to 
impose fundamentalist Sharia across Northern Mali, despite Mali’s history of tolerant Islam, and 
as a result heavily contributed to AQIM’s final portion of success. Ansar Dine, and specifically 
its leader Iyad Ag Ghali and his familial contacts, subscribed to AQIM’s fundamentalist ideology 
and helped the group implement its fundamentalist ideology. Unlike the MNLA, Ansar Dine and 
AQIM were resoundingly religious organizations. As a result, AQIM and Ansar Dine had the 
same or similar long-term goal, the creation of a Northern Mali governed by their versions of 
Sharia. The radicalization of prominent local individuals like Ghali made these same individuals 
receptive and willing to assist AQIM’s implementation efforts. In the case of Ghali, his 
radicalization ultimately resulted in the creation of Ansar Dine. By strategically allying with 
these individuals and Ansar Dine, AQIM once again demonstrates its tactic of creating strategic 
alliances with local actors. In this case, allying with Ansar Dine helped AQIM achieve one of its 
major goals in the region and ultimately resulted in the eventual achievement of AQIM’s success, 
as defined by this research.  
  The assistance of local actors was crucial to the implementation of fundamentalist Sharia 
in Northern Mali, but the assistance of prominent and important members of society was 
especially important given their standing in Northern Malian society and their ability to spread 
fundamentalist ideology and gather more support. Many of these radical local actors that assisted 
in the implementation of fundamentalist Sharia were prominent or important members of 
Northern Malian society that had been previously radicalized by fundamentalist-Salafist groups 
like Jamaat ut-Tabligh.157 Jamaat ut-Tabligh (JT) is an Indian missionary organization that 
espouses fundamentalist interpretations of Islam and played an original role in radicalizing the 
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local Tuareg population, notably members of prominent and important Tuareg families. Iyad Ag 
Ghali was radicalized by JT sometime in the 1990s, and his familial background made him an 
especially important asset to AQIM, as Ghali could help further the group’s inroads into the local 
Tuareg community.158 Ghali is from the Ifoghas clan, a notable Tuareg clan responsible for many 
of Northern Mali’s insurrections.159 Two sons of the leader of the Ifoghas clan were also exposed 
to JT’s ideology, one even going to Pakistan to continue his study.160 JT’s interactions with 
prominent Tuareg families and clans helped create a subset of Northern Mali’s population that 
was receptive to fundamentalist forms of Islam, like that espoused by AQIM.  
 Ghali’s radicalization further assisted AQIM in its implementation of fundamentalist 
Sharia, and subsequently AQIM’s last portion of success, as he and Ansar Dine actively 
participated in a variety of activities related to enforcing fundamentalist Sharia. In 2011 Ghali 
had tried to assume leadership of the MNLA, but his reputation of radicalization made the 
secular organization uncomfortable, and as a result he did not gain the position.161 Ghali was then 
introduced to AQIM by Hamada Ag Hama, an ethnic Tuareg AQIM brigade leader, who helped 
further intertwine AQIM and its ally at the time, the MNLA, by inserting AQIM members even 
deeper into the Tuareg community via his familial contacts.162 Instead of leading the MNLA, 
Ghali then turned to AQIM and created Ansar Dine, a predominantly Tuareg ally of AQIM that 
pulled directly from the ranks of the MNLA and the region’s Tuareg population, radicalizing 
young boys.163 Another prominent local individual who was radicalized and then assisted 
AQIM’s implementation of fundamentalist Sharia was Oumar Ould Hamaha, who originally was 
a member of AQIM before assuming a leadership role in Ansar Dine.164 Under the leadership of 
individuals like Ghali and Hamaha, Ansar Dine participated in the massacre at the Malian 
military base in Aguelhok, working alongside both the MNLA and AQIM to counter the Malian 
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government’s presence in Northern Mali. Ansar Dine then eventually turned on the MNLA 
alongside AQIM and MUJAO and helped oust the MNLA from the region. Ansar Dine not only 
helped AQIM consolidate control of the entirety of Northern Mali, the group actively 
participated in AQIM’s fundamentalist implementation — in the report regarding the destruction 
of Timbuktu’s shrines and mosques, Ansar Dine is directly named as the sole organization 
responsible.165 Ansar Dine was not simply following orders dictated to it by AQIM, it instead 
took an active role in implementing fundamentalist Sharia without necessarily being directed to 
do so.  
 Given that Western African Islamic traditions differ greatly from the Salafist or 
Wahhabist ideologies being imported from groups like Al-Qaeda and AQIM, the radicalization of 
local actors like Ansar Dine and Ghali was especially important to achieve AQIM’s goals for the 
region.166 The local population in Northern Mali does not have a cultural context for these strict 
interpretations of Islam, although the population in Northern Mali is predominantly Muslim. 
Fundamentalist groups like Al-Qaeda and ideologues like Osama Bin Laden and Zawahiri 
largely consider traditional and regional forms of Islam to be “impure.”167 For hundreds of years 
Wahhabists, Salafists, and a variety of other fundamentalist proselytizers have come to Western 
Africa in an attempt to convert Western Africans to the “pure,” fundamentalist versions of Islam, 
while also simultaneously declaring the local and traditional forms of Islam to be incorrect, as 
these religions supposedly conflict with the teachings of the Quran.168 Attempts to convert 
Western Africans to purer forms of Islam have historically been unsuccessful, as organizations 
hoping to spread these fundamentalist strains of Islam have historically irritated and offended 
local society.169 Abdelmalek Droukdal himself stressed the importance of carefully navigating 
the application of Al-Qaeda’s version of Sharia and converting the local population to this 
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ideology, being sure to consider the “gradual evolution that should be applied in an environment 
that is ignorant of religion, and a people which hasn't applied Shariah in centuries.170” The strong 
history of Western Africa’s tolerant Islam makes the implementation of fundamentalist Sharia all 
the more impressive, and the assistance of local actors ultimately ensured AQIM’s final portion 
of success.  
   
Sharia as an Indicator of Success 
 With the help of strategic alliances with local actors, AQIM was able to implement 
fundamentalist Sharia, an indicator of success for the Al-Qaeda affiliate’s efforts in Northern 
Mali. The Sharia’s implementation was the result of the AQIM’s zealous adherence to Al-
Qaeda’s fundamentalist interpretations of both the Quran and Sharia largely. Unlike the abuses of 
the MNLA, which often involved a lack of control among the MNLA's ranks and the Tuareg's 
racism towards Northern Mali's other ethnic groups, the punishments carried out by AQIM were 
systematically executed. This systematic punishment is a part of living under the rule of an 
Islamic fundamentalist group, and AQIM’s implementation of its form of Sharia is both a facet 
and indicative of the group’s success in Northern Mali. In order to be able to enforce 
fundamentalist Sharia, AQIM had to first entrench itself in the local context by allying with 
important local actors and then consolidate power and eliminate competition across the region 
with its newfound local ally, Ansar Dine. Implementing and imposing Sharia is the last step in 
AQIM’s quest to control the region. By reaching this step, the group fully demonstrates its 
success in Northern Mali. 
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Conclusion 
  
  This research demonstrates that the different components of AQIM’s success in Northern 
Mali are three-fold and sequential. The group first endeared itself to the local population, 
including both the prominent actors at the top of Northern Malian society, like the MNLA, and 
the masses at the bottom. This allowed the group to begin entrenching itself in the region. 
Eliminating its competition from Northern Mali by expelling the MNLA then allowed AQIM and 
its affiliates to consolidate control. With sole control of the region, AQIM and its allies, notably 
Tuareg-led Ansar Dine, were able to implement their fundamentalist version of Sharia onto 
Northern Mali. These three steps composed and culminated in AQIM’s success in the region, that 
success being defined as the group’s eventual control of territory and implementation of its 
desired governance style.  
   
Implications 
  Understanding how AQIM was able to entrench itself and hold territory in Northern Mali 
is important to better understand how terrorist organizations entrench themselves in the social, 
political, and historical fabric of a specific context. While it is possible that not all terrorist 
organizations use similar strategies, AQIM’s actions shed light on a potential avenue that terrorist 
organizations may choose to gain support from the local population. The assistance and support 
of local actors in the success of AQIM prompts the question of what can be done specifically in 
Northern Mali to combat local actor involvement in a terrorist organization’s operations. 
Intersecting the findings from this research on the role of local actors with research on building 
community resilience towards violent extremists and terrorist organizations may be a beneficial 
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approach to better understand how countering the involvement of local actors in the activities of 
these aforementioned organizations may restrict their operations. Beyond research, for the 
relevant policy practitioners, helping create more resilient communities towards the recruitment 
and radicalization efforts of terrorist organizations may be a viable course of action in places like 
Northern Mali where terrorist organizations are prominent actors in the local context, and will 
likely remain so in the foreseeable future. Building more resilient local communities may be 
beneficial additions to current counterterrorism efforts, moving counterterrorism beyond just 
military action and towards a more comprehensive approach to addressing what drives local 
actors to become involved in terrorist organizations in the first place.  
 
Factors for Success 
  Specifically understanding what allowed AQIM to be successful in Northern Mali can 
assist counterterrorism and countering violent extremism practitioners in addressing the factors 
that allowed the group to entrench itself in the area in the first place, and potentially prevent 
similar incidences from occurring in Northern Mali and elsewhere. The large role local actors 
played in AQIM’s success in Northern Mali could be a repeated phenomenon in other contexts, 
and additional research on the role of local actors in the success of terrorist organizations could 
be beneficial to discern whether or not this phenomenon is unique to AQIM and Al-Qaeda or 
more universal and demonstrated by other actors in other contexts. If local actors play prominent 
roles in the success of other terrorist organizations, then researchers and practitioners wishing to 
mitigate the threat of these actors may be inclined to look further at why the involvement of local 
actors is so important, and why these terrorist organizations so adamantly pursue the support of 
the civilians and groups they operate among – at least at first.  
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Future Research Avenues   
 A potential starting point for additional research could include investigating whether the 
strategic alliances and the hearts and minds tactics are demonstrated across other Al-Qaeda 
affiliates. These other franchises and affiliates operate in a diverse set of contexts, all of which 
pose different problems to the group’s attempts at gaining popular support. That being said, 
demonstrating a potential common behavioral trend among other franchises and affiliates would 
give further credence to the existence of this overarching behavior among Al-Qaeda as a whole. 
Potential affiliates and franchises that may be worth further research are Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabab in Somalia. Of particular interest to this research on 
entrenchment tactics is Al-Qaeda’s newest franchise, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent 
(AQIS), founded in 2014.171 As a new franchise hoping to grow its influence in India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and other South Asian countries, AQIS’s need to entrench itself within the region 
poses an opportunity for researchers to observe how a new terrorist organization initially embeds 
itself. Comparing the actions of AQIS and AQIM may be additionally useful to determine if there 
are behavioral similarities between the two Al-Qaeda franchises.  
 More broadly, it may be pertinent to investigate whether these same tactics are used by 
other terrorist organizations outside the realm of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The Islamic State's 
initial behavior in Iraq and Syria suggests a much different approach – one cemented in fear, 
intimidation, and brutality. Analyzing the entrenchment tactics of the Islamic State, or lack 
thereof, compared to those of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates would serve as a useful comparison 
between the nature of the two groups and the ways in which they gain support from local and 
international populations. Similarly, comparing the behaviors and ideologies of the original 
Islamic State in Syria to those of Islamic State affiliates like the Islamic State in the Greater 
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Sahara (ISGS), the Islamic State in the Philippines, and Boko Haram, may demonstrate common 
trends of behavior between affiliates of international terrorist organizations that are not 
connected with Al-Qaeda. The implications of this research involve understanding how a 
powerful regional terrorist franchise embeds itself into an area, the possibility of a continuity of 
behavior among organizations belonging to the same network, and how overall different terrorist 
organizations interact with local actors in the contexts they operate within.  
   
Epilogue 
 While AQIM was successful by the definition utilized by this research, this success was 
not long-lasting. On January 10, 2013, AQIM and its allies launched a southern offensive 
towards Central Mali, attacking the town of Konna.172 Just 48 hours away was Bamako, and 
AQIM’s proximity to the capital began to worry international actors.173 This offensive catalyzed 
French involvement in the Malian conflict as the French, US, and other European powers were 
concerned AQIM would attempt to take Bamako. The French additionally feared for the safety of 
the over 6,000 French citizens located in Mali at that time, so in response to this Islamist 
offensive, Operation Serval was launched.174   
 Operation Serval originally involved simply protecting southern Mali from further Islamist 
movement by acting as a barrier between the North and the South.175 Eventually, however, 
Operation Serval changed from a defensive to an offensive operation to directly take back the 
north from AQIM and its allies in the region.176 The French deployed airstrikes against AQIM 
and its allies to stop any further southern advances, and then began to retake Northern Mali’s 
major cities. By the end of January 2013, the same month AQIM launched the original southern 
offensive, the French military had taken control of all three of Northern Mali’s regional capitals, 
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Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal.177 The French were eventually joined by an African Union 
peacekeeping mission, which in July 2013 turned over its authority to a new UN mission 
deployed to Mali — the Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, or 
MINUSMA.178 
 The French intervention in Mali proved disastrous for AQIM and its Islamist affiliates, as 
they were scattered across the Sahel and largely expelled from the country. In the words of 
General Bernard Barrera, the leader of France’s intervention, the French “broke Al-Qaeda’s 
neck.”179 But despite the disastrous losses inflicted on AQIM in January 2013, within recent 
years the Sahel, and notably Northern Mali, has experienced a major increase in the number and 
severity of terrorist attacks. MINUSMA, the UN mission deployed in 2013, is now the deadliest 
UN mission in the world — since its deployment in 2017, 118 peacekeepers have been killed.180 
In 2017 and 2018, Mali experienced more than 200 different terrorist attacks, which are quickly 
becoming deadlier, especially as Northern Mali’s Islamist groups improve their knowledge and 
usage of IEDs.181 Much about the context of Northern Mali has changed in the wake of 
Operation Serval and the destruction of AQIM’s hold on the territory. That being said, the 
presence of terrorist groups in Northern Mali remains a facet of the region.  
 Not only have these groups remained in Northern Mali, but new groups have formed, 
either as splinters from existing organizations or as entirely new actors to the region. 
Corresponding with this rise in terrorist activity is the arrival of these new Islamist groups 
operating in Northern Mali. The Islamic State, originally from Iraq and Syria, is now operating in 
the Sahel and West Africa, creating more competition for AQIM. In late August of 2018, France 
reportedly killed Mohamed Ag Almouner, a top official of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara 
(ISGS).182 Mokhtar Belmokhtar, one of AQIM's emirs, eventually joined forces with remnants of 
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MUJAO to create the group al-Mourabitoun, which later went on to kill a number of miners at 
the French Areva uranium mine.183 Eventually, however, the three remaining jihadist groups in 
Northern Mali not including affiliates of the Islamic State – Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and 
AQIM -- joined together to create the "Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims," otherwise 
known as JNIM.184 Currently, the two main terrorist organizations in Northern Mali are ISGS 
and JNIM.  
  Operation Serval was devastating to AQIM’s efforts in Northern Mali. The group is no 
longer one of the sole organizations operating in Northern Mali, and instead is now part of the 
terrorist organization coalition JNIM. While AQIM was demonstrably weak against international 
forces, the group is a persistent presence in Northern Mali, even among a coalition of various 
other terrorist organizations. The three-fold, sequential path to success outlined in this research 
demonstrates how AQIM came to control Northern Mali originally. AQIM has taken control of 
Northern Mali before, and in the face of escalating terrorist activity, it is possible that the group 
will follow a similar blueprint again.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
Notes 
1 “Northern Mali at a glance,” OECD, accessed February 17, 2019, 
http://www.oecd.org/swac/northernmaliataglance.htm. 
2 “A Closer Look at Sharia in the United States,” ING, accessed April 22, 2019, https://ing.org/a-closer-look-at-
sharia-in-the-united-states/. 
3 Alta Grobbelaar and Hussein Solomon, “The origins, ideology and development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb,” Africa Review 7, no. 2 (2015): 150. 
4 “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, accessed February 17, 
2019, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/65. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Sergei Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, insurgency, or organized crime?” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016): 919. 
7 “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Counter Extremism Project, October 11, 2018, accessed November 5, 2018, 
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim. 
8 “Major Extremist and Terrorist Incidents,” Burkina Faso: Extremism and Counter-Extremism, Counter Extremism 
Project, accessed February 17, 2018 https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/burkina-
faso#major_extremist_and_terrorist_incidents. 
9 “Programs and Initiatives,” U.S. Department of State, accessed March 17, 2019, 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSCTP. 
10 “France sets up anti-Islamist force in Africa’s Sahel,” BBC, July 14, 2014, accessed March 17, 2019, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28298230. 
11 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, The Homeland Threat 
Landscape and U.S. response, 113th Cong., 2013, 2, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2013-11-
14%20SHSGAC%20HEARING%20(M.%20OLSEN).pdf. 
 “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated January 9, 2018, accessed November 4, 2018, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab. 
12 Osama Bin Laden, letter to Shaykh Mahmud, 2010. 
13 Ayman al-Zawahiri, letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, published by BBC, 4, accessed October 23, 2018, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/zawahiri_12_10_05.pdf. 
14 “The Al-Qaeda-Taliban Nexus,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 24, 2009, accessed November 4, 2018, 
https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/al-qaeda-taliban-nexus. 
15 Zack Gold and Pamela G. Faber, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI): An Al-Qaeda affiliate case study, CNA Analysis and 
Solutions, 2017, accessed November 4, 2018, 10. 
16 Jennifer G. Cooke, Thomas M. Sanderson, J. Caleb Johnson, and Benjamin Hubner, Militancy and the arc of 
Instability: Violent Extremism in the Sahel, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016, 
accessed February 20, 2018, 9. 
17 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel region: Corruption, contraband, jihad and the 
Mali war of 2012-2013, (Routledge, 2014): 16. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency: 28. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency: 176. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency: 180. 
25 “Ansar Dine,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, updated August 8, 2016, accessed February 
19, 2019, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/437#cite10. 
26 “Movement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford 
University, updated August 8, 2016, accessed February 19, 2019, 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/631. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Bruno Charbonneau, “Intervention in Mali: building peace between peacekeeping and counterterrorism,” Journal 
of Contemporary African Studies 35, no. 4 (2017): 417. 
29 “The founding declaration of National Movement of Azawad (MNA),” November 11, 2011, accessed October 16, 
2018, http://www.mnlamov.net/actualites/58-la-declaration-fondatrice-mouvement-national-de-lazawad-l-mna-
                                                             
 
60 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
r.html. 
30 Grobbelaar and Solomon, “The origins, ideology and development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” 153. 
31 Baz Lecocq and George Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali,” International Journal 68, no. 3 (September 2013): 
131. 
32 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency: 184. 
33 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency: 182. 
34 Audrey Croth Cronin, “ISIS is not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Jihadist 
Threat,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (March/April 2015): 2.  
35 "insurgency," In Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought, by Roger Scruton. 3rd ed. Macmillan 
Publishers Ltd, 2007, 
http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/macpt/insurgency/0?institution
Id=1724. 
36 “Counterinsurgency,” Marine Corps Field Manual No. 3-24, released December 15, 2006, accessed April 23, 
2019, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=468442.  
37 “How Do Terrorists Measure Success,” Stratfor, accessed February 24, 2019, 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/how-do-terrorists-measure-success. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (Columbia University Press: New York, 2017): 207.  
44 Aaron Clauset, Lindsay Heger, Maxwell Young, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsche, “The Strategic Calculus of 
Terrorism: substitution and competition in the Israel-Palestine conflict,” Cooperation and Conflict 45, no. 1: 27. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Aaron Clauset, Lindsay Heger, Maxwell Young, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsche, “The Strategic Calculus of 
Terrorism,” 19. 
47 Sahar Khan, “Double Game: Why Pakistan Supports Militants and Resists U.S. Pressure to Stop,” CATO Institute, 
September 20, 2018, accessed April 25, 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/double-game-why-
pakistan-supports-militants-resists-us-pressure-stop#full.  
48 Boaz Ganor, “Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?” Media Asia 29, no. 3 
(2002): 132. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Boaz Ganor, “Defining terrorism,” 125. 
51 Boaz Ganor, “Defining terrorism,” 123. 
52 Grobbelaar and Solomon, “The origins, ideology and development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” 153. 
53 Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, “Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
29, no. 4 (2006): 313. 
54 Brachman and McCants, “Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook,” 311. 
55 Brachman and McCants, “Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook,” 313. 
56 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 183. 
57 Caitriona Dowd, “Grievances, governance and Islamist violence in sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 53, no. 4 (2015): 527. 
58 Dowd, “Grievances, governance and Islamist violence in sub-Saharan Africa,” 516. 
59 Dowd, “Grievances, governance and Islamist violence in sub-Saharan Africa,” 520. 
60 Dowd, “Grievances, governance and Islamist violence in sub-Saharan Africa,” 523. 
61 Grégory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme, The roots of Mali’s conflict: Moving beyond the 2012 crisis, The 
Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2015, 29. 
62 Chauzal and van Damme, The roots of Mali’s conflict, 8. 
63 Chauzal and van Damme, The roots of Mali’s conflict, 15. 
64 Chauzal and van Damme, The roots of Mali’s conflict, 45. 
65 Dowd, “Grievances, governance and Islamist violence in sub-Saharan Africa,” 523. 
66 Richard Shultz, “The Limits of Terrorism in Insurgency Warfare: The Case of the Viet Song,” Polity 11, no. 1 
(Autumn, 1978): 80. 
67 Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency or organized crime?” 930. 
68 Ibid. 
 
61 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
69 Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency or organized crime?” 914. 
70 Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 99, no. 1 (January-February 1999) footnote 
2. 
71 Chauzal and van Damme, The roots of Mali’s conflict, 11, footnote 4. 
72 “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” The New York Times, July 1, 2008, accessed November 6, 2018. 
73 Moctar Mariko and Florent Geel, War crimes in North Mali, FIDH, 2012, 5. 
74 Jennifer G. Cooke, Thomas M. Sanderson, J. Caleb Johnson, and Benjamin Hubner, Militancy and the arc of 
Instability: Violent Extremism in the Sahel, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016, 
accessed February 20, 2018, 17. 
75 “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” The New York Times. 
76 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 176. 
77 Mariko and Geel, War crimes in North Mali, 12. 
78 Mariko and Geel, War crimes in North Mali, 13. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Grobbelaar and Solomon, “The origins, ideology and development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” 153. 
81 Jennifer G. Cooke and Thomas M. Sanderson, “Militancy and the Arc of Instability: Violent Extremism in the 
Sahel,” CSIS, (September 2016): 17. 
82 Norman Cigar and Stephanie E. Kramer, Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War, Marine Corps University Press: 
Quantico, VA (2011): 136. 
83 Cigar and Kramer, Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War, 137.  
Carlotta Gall, “Tunisia: Al Qaeda Announces Jihadist’s Death,” The New York Times, October 5, 2015, accessed 
February 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/world/africa/tunisia-al-qaeda-announces-jihadists-
death.html. 
84 “Northern Mali at a glance,” OECD, http://www.oecd.org/swac/northernmaliataglance.htm. 
85 “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” The New York Times. 
86 “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” The New York Times. 
87 Kalev I. Sepp, “From ‘shock and awe’ to ‘hearts and minds’: the call and rise of US counterinsurgency capability 
in Iraq,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 218. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” 8. 
90 Osama Bin Laden, letter to Shaykh Mahmud, 2010. 
91 Boubacar Ba and Morten Bøås, Mali: A Political Economy Analysis, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
(2017): 13.  
92 Dowd, “Grievances, governance and Islamist violence in sub-Saharan Africa,” 159. 
93 Morten Bøås and Liv Elin Torheim, “The Trouble in Mali – corruption, collusion, resistance,” Third World 
Quarterly 34, no. 7: 1287. 
94 Francesco Strazzari, “Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group 
formation in northern Mali,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, (January 2015): 7. 
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_Azawad_Dec2014.pdf. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 May Ying Welsh, “Mali: The ‘gentle’ face of al-Qaeda,” Al-Jazeera, December 30, 2012, accessed January 30, 
2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/2012review/2012/12/20121228102157169557.html. 
98 Chauzal and van Damme, “The roots of Mali’s conflict: Moving beyond the 2012 crisis,” 34. 
99 Morten Bøås, “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s blueprint for securing control of Northern Mali,” CTC Sentinel 
7, no. 4 (April 2014): 4 
100 May Ying Welsh, “Mali: The ‘gentle’ face of al-Qaeda.” 
101 Ibid.  
102 Ibid.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 186. 
107 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 188. 
108 Mariko and Geel, War crimes in North Mali, 16. 
109 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 183. 
 
62 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
110 Mariko and Geel, War crimes in North Mali, 14. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Mariko and Geel, War crimes in North Mali, 15. 
113 Mariko and Geel, War crimes in North Mali, 16. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Lecocq and Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali,” 432. 
117 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 182. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 183. 
120 Lecocq and Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali,” 432. 
121 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 182. 
122 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 183. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Yaya J. Fanusie and Alex Entz, “Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb Financial Assessment,” Foundation for 
Defense of Democracies, December 2017: 2. 
129 Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014, 
accessed January 12, 2019. 
130 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report 
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Executive Summary,” July 22, 2004, 
14, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Fanusie and Entz, “Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb Financial Assessment,” 2. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 183. 
135 Thomas Hofnung, “Interview with Bilal Ag-Acherif, leader of the national movement for the liberation of 
Azawad, advocates the right to self-determination of Azawad,” November 29, 2012, accessed November 15, 2018, 
http://www.mnlamov.net/?start=244. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 “Top UN Official tells Security Council crisis in Mali could be at turning point, but military action must be 
matched by equal focus on political challenges,” Security Council 6905th Meeting, January 22, 2013, accessed 
December 12, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10892.doc.htm. 
139 Kassim Kone, “A Southern view on the Tuareg Rebellions in Mali,” African Studies Review 60, no. 1 (April 
2017): 68-69. 
140 Lecocq and Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali,” 431. 
141 Lecocq and Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali,” 427. 
142 “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” The New York Times. 
143 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 183. 
144 “Ansar Dine fighters destroy Timbuktu shrines,” Al-Jazeera, June 30, 2012, accessed April 25, 2019, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/06/2012630101748795606.html. 
145 Ibid. 
146 “Situation in Mali – Article 53(1) Report,” International Criminal Court (16 January, 2013): 31. 
147 “Situation in Mali – Article 53(1) Report,” International Criminal Court, 30. 
148 Mariko and Geel, War crimes in North Mali, 17. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 “Situation in Mali – Article 53(1) Report,” International Criminal Court, 31. 
152 “Situation in Mali – Article 53(1) Report,” International Criminal Court, 31. 
153 Ibid. 
154 “Situation in Mali – Article 53(1) Report,” International Criminal Court, 32. 
155 Ibid. 
 
63 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
156 Ibid. 
157 Chauzal and van Damme, The roots of Mali’s conflict, 11, footnote 4. 
158 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 98. 
159 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 98. 
160 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 159. 
161 Chauzal and van Damme, The roots of Mali’s conflict, 11, footnote 4. 
162 Mariko and Geel, War crimes in North Mali, 10. 
163 Chauzal and van Damme, The roots of Mali’s conflict, 36. 
Lt. Col. Rudolph Atallah, “The Tuareg Revolt and the Mali Coup,” ASPJ Africa & Francophonie, 1st Quarter 
(2013): 74, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-04_Issue-1/atallah_e.pdf. 
164 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 180. 
165 Mariko and Geel, War crimes in North Mali, 18. 
166 Chauzal and van Damme, The roots of Mali’s conflict, 11, footnote 4. 
167 Miles, “Shari’a as de-Africanization: Evidence from Hausaland,” 52. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Miles, “Shari’a as de-Africanization: Evidence from Hausaland,” 58. 
170 Abdelmalek Droukdal, letter to the Shura Council and Ansar Dine, accessed November 1, 2018, published by the 
Associated Press, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/838898/aqp-sahara-playbook.pdf. 
171 “Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent,” Counter Extremism Project, accessed February 4, 2019, 
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-qaeda-indian-subcontinent-aqis. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Michael Shurkin, “France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 
accessed February 4, 2019: 7. 
174 Shurkin, “France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army,” 8. 
175 Michael Shurkin, “France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army,” 9. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Cooke, Sanderson, Johnson, and Hubner, Militancy and the arc of Instability, 18. 
178 Cooke, Sanderson, Johnson, and Hubner, Militancy and the arc of Instability, 19. 
179 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 218. 
180 Kevin Sieff, “The world’s most dangerous U.N. mission,” The Washington Post, February 17, 2017, accessed 
January 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-
mission/?utm_term=.dc2b63de26be. 
181 Ibid. 
182 “France says it kills top Islamic State official in Mali operation,” Reuters, August 27, 2018, accessed January 14, 
2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-mali/france-says-it-kills-top-islamic-state-official-in-mali-
operation-idUSKCN1LC21H.  
183 Stephen A. Harmon, Terror and Insurgency, 225. 
184 “Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimun,” CSIS, last updated September 25, 2018, accessed January 14, 2019, 
https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-
muslimin. 
 
64 
Bibliography 
 
“A Closer Look at Sharia in the United States.” ING. Accessed April 22, 2019. https://ing.org/a- 
closer-look-at-sharia-in-the-united-states/. 
 
“Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.” Counter Extremism Project. Accessed February 4, 2019.  
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-qaeda-indian-subcontinent-aqis. 
 
“Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” Counter Extremism Project. October 11, 2018. Accessed  
November 5, 2018. https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-
aqim. 
 
“Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University.  
Accessed February 17, 2019. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/65. 
 
“Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed November 4, 2018.   
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab. 
 
al-Zawahiri, Ayman. Letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Published by BBC. Accessed October 23,  
2018. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/zawahiri_12_10_05.pdf. 
 
“An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal.” The New York Times. July 1, 2008. Accessed  
November 6, 2018. 
 
“Ansar Dine.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University. Updated August 8, 2016.  
Accessed February 19, 2019. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi- 
bin/groups/view/437#cite10. 
 
“Ansar Dine fighters destroy Timbuktu shrines.” Al-Jazeera. June 30, 2012. Accessed April 25,  
2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/06/2012630101748795606.html. 
 
Atallah, Lt. Col. Rudolph. “The Tuareg Revolt and the Mali Coup.” ASPJ Africa &  
Francophonie, 1st Quarter (2013): 74.  
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-04_Issue- 
1/atallah_e.pdf. 
 
Ba, Boubacar and Morten Bøås. Mali: A Political Economy Analysis. Norwegian Institute of  
International Affairs. 
 
Boeke, Sergei. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, insurgency, or organized crime?”  
Small Wars and Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016): 914-936. 
 
Brachman, Jarret M. and William F. McCants, “Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook,” Studies in  
Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 309-321. 
 
 
65 
Callimachi, Rukmini. “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror.” The New York Times,  
July 29, 2014, accessed January 12, 2019. 
 
 
“Caravan for peace part II: Mali’s call for peaceful dialogue returns to the US, featuring Leila  
Gobi and Mamadou Kelly.” Rock, Paper, Scissors. Accessed March 18, 2019.  
http://archive.rockpaperscissors.biz/index.cfm/fuseaction/current.press_release/project_id 
/721.cfm. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. Map of Mali. Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the  
University of Texas – Austin. 
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/mali_pol_1994.pdf. Accessed April 24, 2019. 
 
Charbonneau, Bruno. “Intervention in Mali: building peace between peacekeeping  
and counterterrorism.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 35, no. 4 (2017): 415-
431. 
 
Chauzal, Grégory and Thibault van Damme. The roots of Mali’s conflict: Moving beyond the  
2012 crisis. The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2015. 
 
Cigar, Norman and Stephanie E. Kramer. Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War. Marine Corps  
University Press: Quantico, VA, 2011. 
 
Clauset, Aaron, Lindsay Heger, Maxwell Young, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. “The Strategic  
Calculus of Terrorism: substitution and competition in the Israel-Palestine conflict.”  
Cooperation and Conflict 45, no. 1 (2010): 6-33. 
 
Cooke, Jennifer G., Thomas M. Sanderson, J. Caleb Johnson, and Benjamin Hubner. Militancy  
and the arc of Instability: Violent Extremism in the Sahel. Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. 2016. Accessed February 20, 2018. 
 
“Counterinsurgency.” Marine Corps Field Manual No. 3-24. Released December 15, 2006.  
Accessed April 23, 2019. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=468442. 
 
Cronin, Audrey Croth. “ISIS is not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the  
Latest Jihadist Threat.” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (March/April 2015): 87-98.  
 
Dowd, Caitriona. “Grievances, governance and Islamist violence in sub-Saharan Africa,”  
Journal of Modern African Studies 53, no. 4 (2015): 505-531. 
 
Droukdal, Abdelmalek. Letter to the Shura Council and Ansar Dine. Accessed November 1,  
2018. Published by the Associated Press.  
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/838898/aqp-sahara-playbook.pdf. 
 
Fanusie, Yaya J. and Alex Entz. “Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb Financial Assessment.”  
Foundation for Defense of Democracies. December 2017. 
 
66 
 
Fishman, Brian. “After Zarqawi: The dilemmas and future of Al Qaeda in Iraq.” The Washington  
Quarterly 29, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 19-32. 
 
“France says it kills top Islamic State official in Mali operation.” Reuters. August 27, 2018.  
Accessed January 14, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-mali/france-says- 
it-kills-top-islamic-state-official-in-mali-operation-idUSKCN1LC21H.  
 
“France sets up anti-Islamist force in Africa’s Sahel.” BBC. July 14, 2014. Accessed March 17,  
2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28298230. 
 
Gall, Carlotta. “Tunisia: Al Qaeda Announces Jihadist’s Death.” The New York Times. October  
5, 2015. Accessed February 28, 2019.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/world/africa/tunisia-al-qaeda-announces-jihadists-
death.html. 
 
Ganor, Boaz. “Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?” Media  
Asia 29, no. 3 (2002): 287-304. 
 
Gold, Zack and Pamela G. Faber. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI): An Al-Qaeda affiliate case study.  
CNA Analysis and Solutions, 2017. Accessed November 4, 2018. 
 
Grobbelaar, Alta and Hussein Solomon. “The origins, ideology and development of Al-Qaeda in  
the Islamic Maghreb.” Africa Review 7, no. 2 (2015): 149-161. 
 
Harmon, Stephen A. Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel region: Corruption,  
contraband, jihad and the Mali war of 2012-2013. Routledge, 2014. 
 
Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press: New York. 2017. 
 
Hofnung, Thomas. “Interview with Bilal Ag-Acherif, leader of the national movement for the 
liberation of Azawad, advocates the right to self-determination of Azawad.” November 
29, 2012. Accessed November 15, 2018. http://www.mnlamov.net/?start=244. 
 
“How Do Terrorists Measure Success.” Stratfor. September 22, 2017. Accessed February 24,  
2019. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/how-do-terrorists-measure-success. 
 
“Independent Azawad No More: Northern Mali in Islamist Hands.” Political Geography Now.  
Map of Mali as of September 6, 2012. Accessed April 25, 2019.  
https://www.polgeonow.com/2012/09/azawad-islamists-mali-map.html 
 
"Insurgency." In Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought, by Roger Scruton. 3rd ed.  
Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 2007.  
http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/mac 
pt/insurgency/0?institutionId=1724. 
 
 
67 
“Islamic militancy in the Sahel: Four key trends.” Control Risks. January 9, 2019. Accessed  
February 3, 2019. https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/islamist-militancy- 
in-the-sahel. 
 
“Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimun.” CSIS. Last updated September 25, 2018. Accessed  
January 14, 2019. https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-
backgrounders/jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin. 
 
Khan, Sahar. “Double Game: Why Pakistan Supports Militants and Resists U.S. Pressure to  
Stop.” CATO Institute. September 20, 2018. Accessed April 25, 2019. 
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/double-game-why-pakistan-supports-
militants-resists-us-pressure-stop#full. 
 
Kingsbury, Damien and Lesley McCulloch. “Terrorists and Freedom Fighters.” The World  
Today 57, no. 11 (November 2001): 13-14. 
 
Kone, Kassim. “A Southern view on the Tuareg Rebellions in Mali.” African Studies Review 60,  
no. 1 (April 2017): 53-75. 
 
Lecocq, Baz and George Klute. “Tuareg Separatism in Mali.” International Journal 68, no. 3  
(September 2013): 424-434. 
 
“Major Extremist and Terrorist Incidents.” Burkina Faso: Extremism and Counter-Extremism.  
Counter Extremism Project. Accessed February 17, 2018.  
https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/burkina-
faso#major_extremist_and_terrorist_incidents. 
 
“Mali: Timbuktu, Gao and Mopti – Internal Displacement.” ACAPS Briefing Note: Mali  
Displacement. Relief Web. June 19, 2015. Accessed January 14, 2019.  
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b-acaps-briefing-note-northern-
mali-internal-displacement-19-june-2015.pdf. 
 
Map of Mali. “Mali Nyeta – Frequently Asked Questions About Mali, West Africa.”  
https://www.malinyeta.org/faqs/#lightbox[auto_group1]/0/. Accessed April 24, 2019. 
 
Mariko, Moctar and Florent Geel. War crimes in North Mali. FIDH. 2012. 
 
Miles, William F. S. “Shari’a as de-Africanization: Evidence from Hausaland.” Africa Today 50,  
no. 1 (Spring – Summer 2003): 51-75. 
 
Morten, Bøås, and Liv Elin Torheim. “The Trouble in Mali – corruption, collusion, resistance.”  
Third World Quarterly 34, no. 7 (2013): 12791292. 
 
Morten, Bøås. “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s blueprint for securing control of Northern  
Mali.” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 4 (April 2014): 1-6. 
 
 
68 
“Movement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest.” Mapping Militant  
Organizations. Stanford University. Updated August 8, 2016. Accessed February 19,  
2019. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/631. 
 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. “The 9/11 Commission  
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United  
States Executive Summary.” July 22, 2004, 14. http://www.9- 
11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf. 
 
“New Country: Azawad Declares Independence From Mali.” Political Geography Now. Map of  
Mali as of April 6, 2012. Accessed April 25, 2019.  
https://www.polgeonow.com/2012/04/new-country-azawad-declares.html 
 
“Northern Mali at a glance.” OECD. Accessed February 17, 2019,  
http://www.oecd.org/swac/northernmaliataglance.htm. 
 
Osama Bin Laden. Letter to Shaykh Mahmud. 2010. 
 
“Programs and Initiatives.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed March 17, 2019.  
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSCTP. 
 
Sepp, Kalev I. “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency.” Military Review 99, no. 1 (January- 
February 1999): 8-12. 
 
Sepp, Kalev I. “From ‘shock and awe’ to ‘hearts and minds’: the call and rise of US  
counterinsurgency capability in Iraq.” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 217 –  
230. 
 
Shultz, Richard. “The Limits of Terrorism in Insurgency Warfare: The Case of the Viet Song.”  
Polity 11, no. 1 (Autumn, 1978): 67-91. 
 
Shurkin, Michael. “France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army.” RAND  
Corporation, 2014. Accessed February 4, 2019. 
 
Sieff, Kevin. “The world’s most dangerous U.N. mission.” The Washington Post. February 17,  
2017. Accessed January 14, 2019.  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n- 
peacekeeping-mission/?utm_term=.dc2b63de26be. 
 
“Situation in Mali – Article 53(1) Report.” International Criminal Court. 16 January, 2013. 
 
Strazzari, Francesco. “Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of  
armed group formation in northern Mali.” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. J
 anuary 2015.  
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali 
_Azawad_Dec2014.pdf. 
 
69 
 
“The Al-Qaeda-Taliban Nexus.” Council on Foreign Relations. November 24, 2009. Accessed  
November 4, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/al-qaeda-taliban-nexus. 
 
“The founding declaration of National Movement of Azawad (MNA).” November 11, 2011.  
Accessed October 16, 2018. http://www.mnlamov.net/actualities/58-la-declaration-
fondatrice-mouvement-national-de-lazawad-l-mna-r.html. 
 
“Top UN Official tells Security Council crisis in Mali could be at turning point, but military  
action must be matched by equal focus on political challenges.” Security Council 6905th  
Meeting. January 22, 2013. Accessed December 12, 2018.  
https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10892.doc.htm. 
 
Unknown Author. Advanced draft of Al-Qaeda’s bylaws. AFGP-2002-600048 CIA. Translated  
April 18, 2002. 
 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The  
Homeland Threat Landscape and U.S. response. 113th Cong. 2013, 2.  
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2013-11-
14%20SHSGAC%20HEARING%20(M.%20OLSEN).pdf.  
 
Welsh, May Ying. “Mali: The ‘gentle’ face of al-Qaeda.” Al-Jazeera. December 30, 2012.  
Accessed January 30, 2019.  
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/2012review/2012/12/201212281021571695
57.html. 
 
